NATIONAL SECUTY POLICY2


  Policy Planning. Staff Piles .
  Mr. Vanneval Bruh toth      Gair~man bof the Joint Chiefsof Staff
                             (Braa ve),
  TOP SECRET                 -WASIN4GTON, April 13, 1950
  -DEAR ,GENERAL BwzDuiEr: I[ have. recently worked, with .th Army,
  in a group assembled by Secretary Gray,2 on problems: concerning
  defense of a line inEurope. The direct results have: beefi embodied in
  areport .,Which wwil no doubt.have serious attention _
  In :the course of that study I ,have again after a considerable.inter-
  val delved into many military matters, and I have come to.a number
  of personal conclusions which reach far.beyond the scope of the direc-
  tive whichini-tiated that study. They are serious and disturbing con-
  clusions. I have:. accordingly Summarized them briefly in .this letter,
  which. I ýplace in your hands9 to use- as YoU. maY see"fit.-
  The problem of defense: ofthe United- States is in.,a serious condi-
  tion, at which- -I am appalled. If this problem is attackedpdvigorously
  at this time, and ,properly, coordinated, with first things comingfirst$-
  it can be" put, in satis-facdory condition in a few years. If. we
drift as
  we are going, it will remain- in unsatisfactory condition-and might
  well lead to disaster,,.             ..     .    .
  There hasbeen, since the war, a profound alteration in conditions,
  and we haive not- yet altered our approach to meet them. Soon after
  the war it appeared, with the A-bomb in.our sole, possession, andv with
  adequate meins of delivering it, that we would thusmaintain the peace
  of the world. Further, if war broke out suddenly, we could promptly
  bring it to a success fulconclusion by this means alone. This may or
  may not have been ,true at the time; it is certainly not true now, We,
  ha-ve no monopoly of the A-bomb, and the defense against.bomber
attack has increased: enormously and is increasing every day.
  ThThe"result is that if war should break out tomorrow it would be
a
long desperate ,war, inwhich we would.suffer major initial disasters,
and in which we, ould-hope to prevail only after -a period of years by'
the ultimate weight of our- industrial potential, and after irreparable
damage,
  We have recognized-the altering conditions in our national policy.
The Marshall Plan has prevented the.conquest of Western Europe

  'President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; Director of the Office
of Scientific. Research and Deveilopment during World War H.
  24Gordon Gray,. Secretary of the Army.
  3For documentation on the report: under reference, see vol. ,n, pp. 1 I.


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