NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


  1. The Soviet Union has the military capability at the present time
of taking, or inspiring through satellites, military action ranging from
local aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the
Soviet world to a,l-out general war.
  2. While estimates of probabilities of Soviet action vary it is com-
pletely agreed that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a firm
opinion that the Soviet Union will not take any one or all of the
actions which lie within its military capabilities.
  3. There is unanimous agreement, therefore, that the present world
situation is one of extreme danger and tension which, either by Soviet
desire or by the momentum of events arising from the Korean situa-
tion in which actual warfare is in progress, could present theUnited
States with new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including
general hostilities.
   That is the situation we face, and it is one of gravest danger. It is
becoming apparent to the world that we do not have the capabilities
to face the threat, and the feeling in Europe is changing from one of
elation that the United States has come into the Korean crisis to
petrified fright. People are questioning whether NAT really means
anything, since it means oinly what we are able to, do. Our intentions
are not doubted, but are [our] capabilities are doubted.
   In Asia the fear is manifested in two places-Japan and India. In
Japan the Socialist Party has adopted officially the principle that
there must be a treaty with the Soviet Union as well as with the other
belligerents; t hat Japan should be neutralized and that American
troops should be withdrawn. This is evidence that they believe associa-
titon with the U.S. is dangerous to them.
   In this situation the question is what the United States can do to
affect these trends. Obviously it must do; all possible to deal with
Korean situation and other present dangers, but it must do, more now.
Prompt action is worth more than perfect action. In the very early
days of next week some action must be announced. Whether that action
is the best possible action is less important than that some effective
action be taken and announced.
  The Secretary listed the actions and announcements which must be
made: The President's action regarding increased forces must be an-
nounced. He must ask for money, and if it is a question of asking for
too little or too much, he should ask for too much. He should stress
production and ask for powers of allocation and limitation. This last
the Secretary thought most important; for what we announce as to
military steps will be of some reassurance toi our friends, but will not
deter our enemies; whereas what we do in the line of stepping up
production will (strike fear into our enemies, since it is in this! field
that our great capabilities and effectiveness lie. Finally, the President
should state that what we are doing in production-one of the great
reasons for increased production-is to help our allies speed up their


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