FOREIGN, RELATIONS, 1950, ....VOLUME I


burden- on ....energy, manpower and attention-perhaps a liability
rather than an asset in case of war. In this connection, it would be
helpful to -be able to compare our contributions to build up.other
countries-with the Soviet drain on the satellites.

Policy Planning Staff Piles
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near
  Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to .the Under
  Secretary of State (Webb)
                             [Extracts]

TOP, SECRET                          [WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1950:
Subject: Comments on documents entitled "Draft Report to the
     President" and "State-Defense Staff Study".
   In compliance with your-memorandum of March 30, 1950, the fol-
 lowing are my comments on the two accompanying documents entitled
 "DraftlReport to the President'" and "State-Defense Staff
Study".
   1. The facts adduced are alarmingly convincing. I would raise the
 question, however, whether the dispassionately analytical approach
 used may not result- in overlooking certain less tangible considerations
 which might temper the conclusions reached. For instance, are we yet
 certain that the Soviet venture in China will strengthen the nU.S.S.R.
 to the extent now feared? iHave w-e,, in fact, adequately explored the
 q.uestion of whether there may not be a critical point in Soviet expan.
 sion beyond which the benefits to the! U.S.S.R. will turn to
 disadvantage?
   I realize that' the heavyiresponsibility devolving on the authors of
 documents of such seriousness does not permit of wishful thinking
 but one cannot study international affairs for long without being
 impressed by-the-importance of imponderables arising out of vagaries
 in miass behavior. ýLet us suppos1e,, for example,-that m id-1954
should
 arrive- with Soviet- military strength, increased. as predicted without
 adequate build. up by the United. States. I should,, imagine that the
 U.S.SR. would still give serious consideration to the-morale factor 'in
 the United States and friendly-countries! and that decision nmight well
 be reached on whether our courage and unity was-high -or.whether we
 were dispirited-and disunited., Iwould not suggest that the paper be
 revised to include speculation on such intangibles but I would suggest
 that they be borne in mind in final evaluation.
   2. I have similar misgivings regarding the limited scope of the
 recomnended course of action. As between thefour alternatives men-
 tioned, I agree that the more rapid build-up course is clearly indicated
 in.the political, economic and military fields. I feel however, that we
 will have to go much further if we are going to get the support we
 need from the American and friendly peoples., In the "Draft Report
 to.the President", what we seem to Ibe aiming at is a stepped-up "cold
 war". I don't think wecan get the response we need from the American
 people byv such an approach. What "we have to do is to convince not


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