FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


and if we should come up with any ideas that appear promising, we
will not hesitate to put them forward.
  In our consideration of this problem, we are well aware that the
prohibition of atomic weapons is but one aspect of the armaments
question. It cannot be finally dealt with except in the realization of the
fact that the implementation of a plan for the international control of
atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons must go hand
in hand with the implementation of a plan for the regulation and
reduction of conventional armaments. In the formulation of the re-
spective control and regulation systems, it is essential, and was so
recognized by, the United Nations, to keep the two separate, but, as
I stated before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General As-
sembly on November 19,1949:
   "At no time has any one denied that the two fields are closely inter-
 related-that they are two aspects of the one problem of disarmament.
 The Atomic Energy Commission has been endeavoring to work out
 a suitable and effective system for the control of atomic energy and
 the prohibition of the atomic weapon. The Commission for Conven-
 tional Armaments has been endeavoring to work out the preliminary
 steps for the development of an effective plan for the regulation and
 control of conventional armaments and armed-forces. If and when
 the two -Commissions succeed in developing suitable and acceptable
 plans in their respective fields, therewill be a necessity for coordinat-
 ing the two plans in an over-all system of collective security."5
   This means that whenever there -is agreement on the international
 control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons, we
 would not be in a position of disarming ourselves in one field without
 a compensatory reduction in the striking power of the Soviet land
 armies.
   As I stated earlier, although we do not see much prospect of an early
   agreement in this field with t he Soviet Union, we shall continue our
   efforts in the United Nations to reach agreement. But, as Secretary
   Acheson has said, we must not seek -agreement 'for the sake of reaching
   agreement. We must maintain our economic health and stability in this
   country and increase our strength. We must, in association with the
   other free countries of the world, endeavor to build up our collective
   strength so that the Soviet Union will find itself i mpelled to enter
into
   agreements in this and related fields. In my opinion, such agreements,
   deriving from a strong and united free world, have a good likelihood
   of being carried out by the Soviet Union. I must confess frankly that
   I would have little confidence that the Soviet Union would carry out
   any other kind of agreement. Their bad record in international affairs
   strongly supports this conclusion. Until such agreements are possible,

   For the record of Hickerson's address of November 19, 1949, see GA (IV),
   Ad Hoc Political Committee, pp. 235-236.


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