FOREIGNý RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


must be guided by the premise that a general war is not inevitable
and that, while accepting the probability of local conflicts as the
aggressor pursues his expansionist policy, and we counter this policy
as contemplated in NSC 68, we must govern our approach to and
resolution of each crisis'with our basic objective in view.
  2. In this connection, our current involvement in the Korean crisis
is unique in that it has occurred in the only theater in which the U.S.
is capable of conducting immediate general offensive-operations with
its armed forces. hi all other areas discusse&dherein, the armed forces
of the U.S. are either not appropriately positioned or are of such
inadequacy as to be incapable of effective action in the event of fur-
ther crises.
  3. It is emphasized that the conclusions which emanate from this
study can only be derived after the completion of the second part of
this review which will determine whether the U.S. is in a position
to take'the action regarded as necessary under the terms of this draft.

                              PART I
ESTIM3ATE OF POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES IN THE LIGHT OF THE
  KOREAN SITUATION AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE POSITION OF THE UNITED
  STATES
I. Soviet Intentions
  4. The assessment of the danger of further Communist moves in
other areas can be undertaken only in the light of the most likely
pattern of Soviet intentions. The general conclusion reached in NSC
68 was-that the Kremlin does not now intend to engage in a major
war. The events of the past few days, which do not invalidate this con-
clusion, strongly indicate the following pattern:
  5. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Kremlin did
not intend to bring about a general war or to involve the USSR in
a showdown with us. Its aim was rather to acquire strategic control
over South Korea, and at the same time to probe the attitude of the
United States by confronting us with the following choices:
  a. To acquiesce in the Communist seizure of South Korea. thus
suffering a tremendous prestige defeat and the loss of public confidence
everywhere; or
  b. To become involved in a profitless and discreditable war of attri-
tion with the Soviet satellites in Asia, wasting our military forces and
turning all Asiatic peoples against us.
In either case, the Kremlin hoped that the ultimate outcome would be
our retirement from the Asiatic scene.
  6. The Kremlin has calculated its moves with a view to keeping
the responsibility 'of the Soviet Government unengaged and its own
military forces uncomm itted.".......


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