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FOREIGN RELATIONS) 19 5 0, VOLUME I


         SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET :COMMENTS ON NSC 68
  These comments are directed primarily at the non-military aspects
of the document. There is an inadequate definition of objectives and
means, and a failure to assess-or to make possible an assessment of-
the implications of the proposed courses of action. It is not enough
to say that objectives should be adopted and then their implementa-
tion spelled out, since the objectives are so general that they cannot
be given meaningful content except in more substantive terms.
            DISCUSSION OF "THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT
   This section of the paper lays an unsound basis for the document as
a whole. The neat dichotomy between "freedom" and "slavery"
is not
a realistic description either of the situation today or of the alterna-
tives as they appear to present themselves to large areas of the world.
There are diverse types and degrees of freedom and slavery, -and it is
doubtful that the extent of hegemony of the United States or even
the extent of national independence is considered -the predominant
measure by many peoples.
   To classify as "free" all those peoples whose governments oppose
 Russia, or we seek to have oppose Russia, is u travesty on the word.
 Freedom as we know it is a highly developed concept, frequently of
 little meaning and less use in dealing with backward or disorganized
 peoples. The most potent weapon of the Russians outside of Eastern
 Europe has been and is revolt against social and economic as-well as
 political inequities. To think of freedom in primarily political terms
 is itself grossly inadequate. But to imply-as this report seems to do,
 despite occasional references of a broader nature-that its most im-
 portant meaning today is the simple ability to preserve national exist-
 ence, is a highly dangerous matter. An upsurge of unadulterated
 nationalism might for the time being lessen or remove the military
 threat of Russia, but it would over time tend to aocentuate the subtle
 undermining of our own system and guarantee the eventual loss of the
 cold war through the proliferation and subsidization of unstable little
 tyrants.
   The gravest error of NSC 68 is that it vastly underplays the role
 of economic and social .change as a factor in "the underlying con-
 flict". Tyranny is not new or strange, even on the Russian scale and
 manner; nor is it unusual for tyranny to ride the crest of swelling
 social and economic pressures, as the Russians are sucessfully doing
 in many parts of the world. The test of survival for an established
 civilization is its ability, not only to defend itself in a military sense,
 but also to handle these pressures by removing or alleviating the
 causes-a most difficult task of adjustment since it frequently requires