-NATIONAL SEQUQRTY. POLICY2


objectives in peace and war and the effect of. . these -objectives on our
strategic plans, i have decided to refer that-Report to the National
Security Councii for consideration, with the request that the National
Security Council provide me with further information.on the implica-
tions of the ConclUsions contained therein. I am particularly anxious
that" the'Councilgive me a clearer rin'dicationof the prgrams which
are envisaged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost
of such programs.
   Because of the effect of thes* Conclusions upon the budgetary and
 economic situation, it is my desire that the Economic Cooperation
 Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the
 Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, participate in the con-
 sideration of this Report by the Council, in addition to the regular
 participation of the Secretary of the TreasUry.
 Pending the urgent completion"of this study, I am concerned that
 action "onexisting programs should not be postponed or delayed. In
 additionit is my desire that no publicity be given to this Report or
 its contents without my approval.
 Sincerely yours,                              HARRY S. TRuMAN


                           [Enclosure 2]
A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of
                       January 31, 19504
TOP .SECRET                          [WAsHINGTON,] April.7, 1950.

                            Contents
                                                           Page 5
Terms of Reference       .......      ................3
Analysis,...      ....................4
     I. Background of the Present World Crisis .........4
     II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States ....  5
   IIL The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin..........
   IV. The 'Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and
          Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin
          design..      ........................             7
            A. Nature of the Conflict  7............        7
            B. Objectives$......................9
            C. Means......     .....................
    V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities-Actual and Poten-1
          tial,..................13
   ....VI. U.S Intentinsand Capabilities-Actual and Potential.  21
   VII. Present Risks........................34

 Ante, p. 141.
 ' The page numbers listed below refer to the source text.


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