REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS


    [Here follows discussion of certain items to be considered by the
 General Assembly.]
 3. Atomi~c Energy (SD/A/C.1/336)~
   Mr. Arneson began with a. review of the melancholy history of ne-
 gotiations on atomic energy, going back -to November 1945 when
 through the Truman-MacKenzie-King-Attlee Declaration the United
 Nations was asked to work out effective control plans for atomic.
 energy. He referred also ,to the establishment of the Atomic Energy
 Commission ,and to the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The principle that
 p-rohibition required effective control had been accepted by the vast
 majority of United Nations members, but the Soviet Union had con-
 tinued to maintain that prohibition could be achieved by itself, and
 had proposed a system of control worth absolutey nothing. Mr. Arne-
 son described the work of the Atomic Energy Commission in working
 toward a system of control. Comparing the Soviet and UN plans,
 Mr. Arneson noted thatt both provided for prohibition of atomic
 weapons, but, while the United Nations plan prohibited nations from
 owning fissionable materials and operating f acilities, the- Soviet plan
 provided .simply for periodic inspection of declared facilities to see
 whether' technical rules for exploitation were being observed, .and if
 suspicion ,arose, the Security Council could call for special investiga-
 tions, with the obvious objection that under the proposed set-up, it
 would be V'irtually impossible for susp~icion to arise.
   Mr. Arneson reviewed the-recommendations in the position paper.
 The United States should not encourage substantive debate on this
 question in the Assembly; this position stemmed from the view that
 questions such as Chinese representation, Korea, and other pressing
 political problems would be the center of attention. Moreover, the
 United States record on effective international control was clear.
   Ambassador Austin asked whether there should not be some recog-
nition of the suspicion which prevails in the Assembly among all
nations that we have not been sincere in our offers, and that we have
imposed a control plan which is too difficult to be carried out. He
wondered whether at least we should not discuss the matter to prove
that we are in dead earnest on this subject and absolutely sincere, that
we are continuing to search for better plans, that we are open-minded,
that we realize the danger of this terrible force and hope for a solu-
tion. Mr. Arneson concurred in this position.
  MIr. Dulles, while agreeing that there was merit in Ambassador
Austin's remarks, thought that there was nothing which the United
States could do which would effectively dissemble the fact that our

  ' Ante, p.'84,


89