NATIONAL -SECURITY POLICY


365


their own standpoint, and they will not come lightly to such a decision.
   14. In Germany, they will continue to try to build up armed
 strength in Eastern Germany and to provide it with a political and
 diplomatic framework (;with respect to peace treaty, alliances with
 other satellite powers, etc.) which would place it in a suitable position
 to make trouble for the western powers, including eventually armed
 action by German units, along the Korean pattern. The recent
 instructions to West German Communists to oppose the occupying
 powers indicate that those communists are regarded as fully expend-
 able, and that their contemplated role in the execution of Soviet plans
 for the extension of communist power to Western Germany is only
 a subsidiary one-the main burden being borne either by eventual
 armed attack from.eastern Germany or, as Moscow continues to hope,
 by an aroused German nationalism, or a combination of the two.
   13. Information on Soviet instructions to the western European
communists indicates only a desire on Moscow's part to be ready for
all contingencies. Moscow is particularly interested in:a build-up of
the sub-surface militant units of the western European communist
par-ties to a point where they could play an important subsidiary role
(by sabotage, civil disorder, seizure and temporary exercise of police
authority, etc.) in the accomplishment of what would be the Soviet
purpose in the event of war. This could be an indication of either
direct offensive intentions or of a sharp anxiety lest general hostili-
ties should break out in the near future. It is more likely to be the
latter.
   16. As far as general world strategy is concerned, the most likely
pattern of Soviet intentions is the following:"
   The Soviet leaders would still like to avoid general hostilities and
hope that their present purposes, namely the promotion of the security
of their own power by the complete shattering of U.S. prestige and
influence outside the North American continent and the subjugation
of all of Eurasia to their own political will, can be achieved by means
less risky, less costly, and less restricting on their own freedom of ac-
tion. In particular, they are not attracted by the prospect (which looms
so large in the minds of people elsewhere) of occupying all of Western
Europe before they are able to crush U.S. industrial and military
power; for they would thereby only place themselves in a position
analogous to that of the Germans in 1942, and incur heavy responsi-
bilities to which there would be no calculable satisfactory termina-
tion at any early date. They still recognize a possibility-in fact, a
fairly strong possibility-that it will prove possible for them to make
satisfactory progress in the accomplishment of their purposes by
means short of general hostilities. In the light of recent events, how-
ever, they probably rate cons derahbly lower than they did some months