222 FOREIGN RELATIQNS, I ~i5A~, ~YOIF~TME I


pion,-unch alengeabl.. The following.eoýn       deal primarily with
the 4lrgumenta~ti~n which s~pports the onclusion and suggestons as t
psnation land emphasis in order thtt. th- 'recmmendations may
carry.the maximum cred en    i shallnotd..e  f6:r: examplewith cerJ-
tain differences of emphasis whieh ' I persoil,!y will , todu  concern-
ing :the Soviet Union, its intentions 'and policies in Chapters .3,4 and
5
since ilt is unnecessary to go intoover-refinement inn discussing the moti-
vations of Soviet policies. However, I will make one comment on this
setion sin ce believe it affects, the balance of the report.
  It is open to question whether or not, as stated, the fundamental
design of the Kremlin is the domination of the world. If by this is
meant.this is the chief purpose and, as it were, the raison d' -tre of the
Kremlin,-this carries ,the implication thalt all other considerations 'are
subordinate to this major purpose and that great risks would be run
for the sake of its achievement. It tends, therefore, to over-simplify
he problem and, in my opinion, leads inevitablyto the conclusion that
war is inevitable, which then rendes the statement of our objectives:
i~e., the frustration of the Soviet design by peaceful me and the pos-
sibility of bringing about thereby a reorientation of Soviet policy to an,
extent which would permit the peaceful 'coexistence of the two systems
[sic]. 1think -that the thought would be more accurate if it were to the
effect that the fundamental design of -those who control theU.S.'S.R. is
(a) the maintenance of their regime in the Soviet Union, and (b),
its extension throughout the world -to the degree that is possible with-
out serious risk to the internal regime. I do not wish to belabor :this
point since it is obviously better to over-simplify in the direction of
greater urgency and danger than it is to over-simplify -the side of com-
placency when dealing with Soviet intentions.
   I believe my chief suggestion concerning this report, which is ex-
cellent in the whole, is that -the conclusions do not in every case stem
directly from the argumentation,. For example, in so far'as I am aware, ....
in every major paper on the Soviet problem and on the U.S. role in
the present world situation, there has been a recommendation that an
essential element in our position must be a strong and adequate defense
posture. In this sense, the paper merely reaffirms 'what has been stand-
ard U.S. position, as is demonstrated by the requotation of N.S.C.
20/4.3 The issue, of course, is whether or not our present defense
establishment and programs for future development are, in fact, ade-
quate to meet the present world' situation" and its probable:_:future
development. The answer is correctly given that it is not, but I do
not believe enough evidence is given to support this contention.

   8NSC 20/4, November-23, 1948. For text, see ForeignReadtionq, 1948, vol.
I,
 Part 2, p. 662.


222