FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


  Preliminary target studies based on the anticipated effects of the
Super have borne out this conclusion. From these studies it appears
that a limited number of strategic and tactical targets will exist, in the
event of hostilities with the USSR, which are peculiarly adapted to
the Super. The estimated effects of the Super on heavy materiel and
structures and on troop concentrations will permit:
       (1) The achievement of certain strategic and tactical objectives
    at a substantial saving in terms of fission bombs, one Super
    replacing 10-50 fission bombs, depending on the specific target.
       (2) A far higher level of assurance of success against certain
    strategic and tactical targets of the highest importance.
       (3) The accomplishment of a level of destruction against very
    heavy structures, troop concentrations, and materiel which,
    though desirable, is not practicable of attainment with fission
    bombs except by heavy expenditure and accurate placenwent on
    target.
  3. Delivery Considerations. The violence of the blast and thermal
effects of the Super require any manned aircraft to be a minimum of
30 miles from the detonation point. This requirement will dictate an
unmanned vehicle to traverse the final 50 to 100 miles to the target.
The development of such a vehicle is a problem which remains to be
solved in conjunction with the development of the weapon itself, being
dependent largely upon the characteristics, physical dimensions and
weight of the weapon. It is impracticable at this time to anticipate
the exact nature of the eventual carrier. It is apparent that eventually
a supersonic unmanned vehicle will be necessary, depending upon the
scientific advancement in the field of guided missile ground-to-air
weapons. It is also apparent that under such conditions of opposition,
a supersonic delivery vehicle is also indicated for fission bombs. Thus
a seemingly paradoxical situation may eventually develop wherein
the larger, more cumbersome Super may eventually be easier to deliver
by virtue of the fact that it may be less demanding for refinements
in the guidance system of the final delivery missile. In any event, in
consideration of the technical problems in the development of the
weapon as compared to the carrier, it is believed that the carrier prob-
lem, although difficult, is the lesser of the two.
  4. Other Important Military Implications. In consideration of the
above military applications for the Super, the potential advantages
of which would accrue to a nation possessing these weapons, the fol-
lowing discussion explores additional military implications under
several hypotheses of possession.
  a. Hypothesis: Sole Possession by the USSR. Aside from the power
ratio differential of the Super as compared to the fission weapon and
of the psychological potential which automatically exists through
enemy exploitation of this ratio differential, there is the added factor
that if we fail to develop a thermonuclear weapon and thereby lack


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