26


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 50, VOLUME l


upon -this factor. It seems generally -otohve been envisaged on our side
ithat quotas would be so arranged as to preserve for us a clear strategic
.:Advantage in the event of seizure.tt One might, however, consider
arrangements looking toward a complete destruction of alllarge stcks
,of nuclear fuel or the disposal in such a manner as would prevent any
-cheap and easy seizure and exploitation for military purposes by
'either side. In other words, one could conceive of an agreement which
would eliminate the factor of strategic advantage entirely, as far as
atomic weapons are concerned.
   Similarly, it would seem that greater clarity could be created on
 the subject of the veto, in its relation to the problem of elnforcement.
 If, as General McNaughton stated in the consultations of the "Six",1
 emphasis has shifted in the Commission "from the unattaina.ble ob-
 jective of prevention and punishment of violators by an autocratic
 and powerful authority to the more reasonable and reliable purpose of
 setting up an effective system to ensure adequate warnings", is it
still
 necessary to hold over the Russian head the determination that "there
 shall be no legal right; by 'veto' or otherwise, whereby a willful viola-
 tor of the terms of the treaty or convention Shall be protected from
 the consequences -of viol'ation -of its terms". §§ In other
words, if we
 are to -rely on adequate notice, rather than prevention, of violation, iS
 there any reason why we should not go the whole 'hog and make it
 entirely clear that in any temporary modus vivendi, at any rate, there
 would be no question of -aweakening of-the veto power in the Security
 Council'?.
   Finally, we could, as indicated above, make an effort to arrange for
 the discussion of these matters through channels where there would be
 better possibilities of gettinig the Russians to talk in a businesslike
 and revealing manner than in the multilateral U.N. bodies where they
 have heretofore been discussed.
   The aibove suggestions are not put forward at this point as recom-
 mendations for a new "United States -plan". They are putrforward

   fI Note the passage from the Acheson-Lilienthal report; "... Once
the plan
 is fully in operation it will afford a great measure of security against
surprise
 attack; it will provide clear danger signals and give ustime, if we take
over
 the available facilities, tooprepare .for atomic warfare. The significant
fact is
 that at all times during the transition period at least such facilities
will con-
 tinue to be located within the United States. C '.." ("A Report
on the I.nter-
 national Control of Atomic Energy", op. cit., p. 50). [Footnote in
the source text.]
   T-U.N. Document A/Permanent Members AEC/SR.9, October24, I1949, p. 3.
   §§See footnote 17. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is
to the address
 by Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative at the First Meeting
of the
 United -Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, in New York. For
 text, see United Nations, OlcialZRecords of the Atomic Energy Commission,
First
 Year, Plenary Meetings (hereafter' cited as AEC, 1, ýt yr., Plenary),
pp. 4-14,-or-
 Department of State Bulletin,, June 23, 1946, pp. 1057-1062, :For documentation
 on United States proposals during 1946 regarding the international control
of
 atomic energy, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 712 ff.]