NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY                   157

     their control. There can be little doubt that the Soviet leaders
     consider control of Germany to be the key to the control of
     Europe and that they will not voluntarily renounce their ambi,
     tion and efforts to control all Germany. The chances of agree-
     ment on a German settlement would therefore appear to be nil
     unless and until the Soviets are obliged to desist from interven-
     tion in Europe.
       B. Japan. The present impasse on the Japanese treaty was
     created by the refusal of the Soviets to participate in treaty-
     makin.g procedure which would not assure them the veto on treaty
     provisions and by the refusal ofthe US and other Western Powers
     to istitute procedures-which would provide for such a veto. This
     is a difficulty which could be overcome if issues of substance could
     be eliminated. The real problem, however, is that the US could not,
     in the present state of the world, leave a disarmed Japan un-
     defended, that is, fail to retain certain armed forces in Japan
     after the conclusion of the treaty, until other means of checking
     international aggression had been established. The Soviets, on the
     other hand, could not be expected to agree to atreaty which pro-
     vided for or permitted the indefinite maintenance of US forces in
     Japan.
       C. Austria. Though the Soviets have again and again pre-
    vented the conclusion- of an Austrian treaty, it had been hoped
    recently that the outstanding issues had been nar rowed down .to
    such a degree that a treaty might be possible. It now appears,
    ho~wever, that the Soviets ,are merely using the remaining issues
    as ,pretexts for delay and that they have decided that their evacu-
    ation of Eastern Austria would not be to their interest at this
    time, no matter what concessions the West might choose to mlake
    short of consigning Austria to the status of a Soviet satellite. The
    Austrian treaty is certainly a test case of the willingness of the
    Soviets to negotiate a 'peaceful settlement based on ,the will of
    the peoples concerned, for here was a case in which the Soviets
    refused to evacuate a countrythe overwhelming majority of whose
    population clearly desired to unite 'with the West.
  8. Independence of Peripheral States. Finally, there is the ques-
tion of freedom from fear of Soviet aggression by states bordering
on the Soviet sphere. Those most recently and seriously threatened
include Indo-China and the other states of South East Asia, Yugo-
slavia, and Greece. Others threatened.in the past and apt to be subject
to new pressures at any time include Finland, Turkey and Iran. There
can obviously be no bargaining over this issue and no concessions
which the West can offer. It is ridiculous to imagine that the Soviet
Union or Soviet interests are threatened by the nations in question.
This issue can be solved only by a demonstration by the Soviet Union
that it intends to live up to its Obligations under the UN Charter,
to refrain from the threat or use of force against these nations, and
to cease interference in their international affairs.