FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME ]


to seize Berlin forcibly or dispose of Tito through overt military ac-
tion. Korea :was only a short step !forward. It was a place where
Soviet might could be impressively demonstrated and where the So-
viet rulers had good reason to suppose that no effective military
counteraction would be taken. At little risk they were playing for
tremendous stakes in power-conscious Asia and in apprehensive Eu-
rope. Even so its repercussions were felt in India, Egypt and other
sensitive spots that entertain doubts about the strength and unity of
the western world vis-a-vis the USSR. Looking back it might have
paid the ;Soviets to have made a greater expenditure to assist the
Chinese in taking Formosa. This would have impressed Asia and
have struck a heavy blow at the unity of the free world. This project
cannot be undertaken now without large risk of involving themselves
as well as China in a war with the US.
  It is clear that the Soviets were prepared to follow up a quick
complete victory in Korea with either another attack where there
were adequate prospects for localizing the conflict or for a great dis-
play of saber rattling at sensitive points. Even though the latter can
be conducted chiefly through the circulation of alarmist rumors, some
shifting of troop-s along frontiers is helpful for both purposes. A
decision as to whether to attack or rattle the saber indeed need not
to have been made until world reaction to the.developments in Korea
became-known.
  It is; unlikely the Soviets expected their action in Korea to meet
with the united condemnation of 53 UN member states or to provoke
a sharp speeding up of defense preparations on a scale calculated to
cope with a maj or crisis rather than with the Korean situation alone.
Thus instead of enjoying an increase in its relative politico-military
position through this step the USSR has precipitated a reverse trend
which will result in time working against it for the next few years. It
must certainly now make some fresh calculations. The following
appear prominent among the possible alternatives:
  1. To undertake an immediate speed up in their own military
mobilization and launch a broad attack in Europe in order to reap
maximum advantage of their present military position. Aside from
rumors circulating throughout the world and reported to us there is
nothing discernible here to indicate they have taken this decision.
Soviet propaganda continues to stress the defense aspect of the
USSR's military might to the Soviet people and what military dis-
positions are known are largely of a defensive character. No urgent
cause has been developed to pull the people into full support of an
offensive move, which even such a dictatorship as this must consider
essential. 'It is interesting that anger over Korea was allowed to sub-


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