NATIONAL'_ SSECURITY POLICY


world's atomic energy activities from the mine to the last use of fission-
able materials was also essential. The delegation of sovereignty which
this implies is necessary for effective control and, therefore, is as neces-
sary for the United States and the rest of the free world as it is
presently unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
  It is also clear that a control authority not susceptible directly or
indirectly to Soviet domination is equally essential. As the Soviet
Union would regard any country not under its domination as under
the potential if not the actual domination of the United States, it is
clear that what the United States and the non-Soviet world must insist
on, the Soviet Union at present reject.
  The principal immediate benefit of international control would be
to make a surprise atomic attack impossible, assuming the elimination
of large reactors and the effective disposal of stockpiles of fissionable
materials. But it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not
agree to the elimination of large reactors, unless the impracticability
of producing atomic power for peaceful purposes had been demon-
strated beyond a doubt. By the same token, it would not now agree
to elimination of its stockpile of fissionable materials.
  Finally, the absence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R. must
be assumed until there is concrete evidence that there has been a
decisive change in Soviet policies. It is to be doubted whether such a
change can take place without a change in the nature of the Soviet
system itself'.
  The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change
in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet
Union- would have to take place before an effective- system of inter-
national control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have
had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommo-
dation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceiv-
able. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17,
1948, in which it is stated that ", . . the majority of the Commission
has been unable to secure . . . their acceptance of the nature and ex-
tent of participation in the world community required of all:nations
in this field. . ... As a result, the Commission has been forced to
recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of
atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of
policy."
  In short, it is impossible to hope than an effective plan for inter-
national control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design
has been, frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change
in Soviet policies has taken place.


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