FOREIGN- RELATIONS, *   OJ504VOLUME 1


   -The fit-t thing w would obvionas hav to do-would be to discuss
this new state of mind with our allies in the.Atlantic Pact group, with
:a view to obtaining their understanding for our background thinking
a.nd- their agreement to the modifications of military planning which
it implies. If it proved impossible t-comre to any meetingof the minds
with our allies on these points a new situation would be created, which
would have to be examined on its mexrits. The other members of the
Atlantic Pact have no formal right, of course, to compel us to plan to
wage war with we pons which we had concluded to be unacceptable
to our people a.s weapons of "first use". On.x the other hand,
we would
have to Calculat the political and psychological damage which might
be doue by overriding their QbjQeions tOo bruta lly, If this 4amage
seemed exorbitant, in term of the cold war, then we would preumably
have no choice but to cearry on with the preset position both asrespects
mijita4ry plans and international con !trol. However, in this case we
s    ihould b careful to bring home to the, Europeans the ful conscious-
enes of the responsibility they were undertaking in, asking us to defer
to them on this point.
   Assuming, however, thag our new position with relation to. the use
 of mass destucetion weapons was finally to commend itself to the other
 membes' f. the Atlantic Pact, group, we would then be able to take
 'a, public position with regard tjo mass de srution, weapons similar
 to that taken by the Soviet Government: namqely that we deplore thO
 eistece an dabhor the use of these -eapo a t we
 teAtion of initiating their uwe againsticanyone; that. we would use them
 ony with        a the t gretst of- reluctance aaid only '.if this were forced
upon
 us by methods, of warfare used against us o our allies; and that in
 ,the absence of intperatio al agreement on. the_ abolition of such
 weap,, s under suitble safeguards we would hold only enough to
 assure that itwould be s~uicidal folly'for anyoneelse toe use them against
 ourselves or our allies. The President being charged with the supreme
 respouib ~ity for the operations of our armed forces,, including1ad-
 vance pla~ni.g activities, this position should bet taken as a matter
 of execu~tive policy, ToIo the extent thatCongress onal opinIio. might
 associate itself with such a Poition, this would -b,.e all, to the good
;J but
 I see no reason why Congressional support need be a prerequisite.
   Having taken such a pulibc atti.ude,, we would then have, for the
 first time since we. begani to amass stockpiles of atomic bob, ' clear
 :nd suitable position from which to address ourselves to the problem
 of inernational control, Our fist decision 'would then ha.ve to be
 whetheri even in these, circy nstances, we would b prepared. t accept
 international control oniterms which would yield ls scurity against
 violaion than the,.preset, U.._, ,propqs..asor whethei we wQoud prefer
 to rest our security on the maintenance of stockpiles -of mass destruc-