NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


   The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United
States have an affirmative program beyond.the solely defensive one
of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program
must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system
based onl freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the
United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic
measures with which and the military shield behind which the free
world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the
cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental
values and to our national security demands that we achieve our ob-
jectives ,by the strategy of the cold war, building up our ,military
strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure vic-
tory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady devel-
opment of the moral and material strength of the free world and its
projection into the Soviet world ýin such a way as to bring about
an
internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program-
harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objec-
tives-is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to
win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the
United States and the rest of the free world.
  This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet
Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant
with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the
United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate
with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The
present world situation, however, is one which militates against suc-
cessful negotiations with the Kremlin-for the terms of agreements
on important pending issues would reflect present realities-and would
therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and
the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up
the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desir-
able for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations
in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by
the Kremlin to the now situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of
the Kremlin to accept equitable.terms or its bad faith in observing
them would assist in consolida"ing popular opinion in the free world
in support of the measures necessaryý to sustain.the build-up.
  In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up
of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world,
and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initia-
the. Kremlin to the ,new ,situation.-Failing that, the unwillingness ,of
the determination and ability of- the freen world to -:frustrate the
Kremlin design of aworldudominated by its Will. S UChevidence is the
only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin


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