FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


however, suggest a greater willingness than in the past to undertake
a course of.action, including-a possible useof force in local areas,
which might lead to an accidental Outbreak of general military con-
flict. Thus the chance of war through miscalculation is increased.
   III.. The several recent Moscow moves should be interpreted as
arising both' from Soviet eagerness to exploit the opportunities pre-
sented by the expansion of-the Soviet empire,-particularly in the Far
East, and from Soviet anxieties overthe problem of imperial control,
especially over Communist, China. T.his problem, already pressing,
is int6esified tby the very successes.which have-beenrecently achieved.
Thenational- deviation of Tito, we know, wasa severe reverse for 'the
Kremlin, Nationalist deviation on the part of Communist China
would -threaten the structure of 'the Soviet imperialist system. Simi-
larly, national deviation else~where would reverse Soviet gains in
Eastern Europe, jeopardize, Soviet oportunities in Southeast Asia
and Moscow's use of foreign Communi*t Parties as instruments of
Sovietforeign poli cy.
  Also-involved, though less directly and urgently, is Moscow's con-
tinuing concern over Western counteractions in Europe. The im-
mediate' effect of these Western actions has been to bar Communist
expansion in Western E urope and to commit American power to the
defenseof Western Europe. Moscow may well discount in part the
lasting nature of these effects, but this would not alter Moscow's
over- all concern, particularly in view of its phobia for magnifying
dangers. The Kremlin consequently is under, constant pressure to
counter US moves, real or imagined, as part of the basic maneuvers
required in its political Warfare with the-US.
  IV. In assuming the risks involved in exploiting its present oppor-
tunities and in dealing with its imperial problems, Moscow appears
to be animated by a general sense of confidence. Th.e Kremlin has
good reason for somewhat increased confidence. It'has developed an
A-bomb; it has achieved the prewar level of production and other
solid economic successes; it has made progress in consolidating its
control over the European satellites; .and it has apparently effected
an increase in the prestige of the Communist Party among the Rus-
sian people. Also contributing is an apparent Moscow belief ,that .an
economic crisis is actually in the incipient stage in the West and that
this and succeeding crises will contribute to tan eventual Soviet7
triumph. It should be stressed, however, that Soviet actions make
clear that M.oscow's faith -in the inevitable disintegration' of capi-
talismis not a passive faith in automatic historical evolution. Instead


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