FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be
desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the
program and to minimize the immediate risks of war. It is urgently
necessary for the United States to determine its negotiating position
and to obtain agreement with its major allies on the purposes and terms
of negotiation.
   In the second place, assuming that the United States in cooperation
 with other free countries decides and acts to increase the strength of
 the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses the path of
 accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary and desirable
 to negotiate on various specific issues with the Kremlin as the area of
 possible agreement widens,
   The Kremlin will have three major objectives in.negotiations with
the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capabilities of
the United States; the second is to prevent the effective mobilization
of the superior potential of the free world in human and material
resources; and the third is to secure a withdrawal of United States
forces -from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan. Depending on
its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's
(particularly the ability and will of the West to sustain its efforts),
it will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve
these major objectives. It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is
such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions.
   The objectives of the United States and other free countries in
negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological ob-
jectives discussed above) are to record, in a formal fashion which will
facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our position, the
process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological,
and economic conditions in the world which will result from adoption
ýof the fourth course of action and which will be supported by the
in-
creasing military strength developed as an integral part of that course
of action. In short, our objectives are to record, where desirable, the
gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process
by making negotiation,'if possible, always more expedient than resort
to force.
  It must be presumed that for some time the Kremlin will accept
agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith whenever
and wherever there is an opportunity to do so with impunity, it can
derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world.
For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are7 enforce-
able or that they are not susceptible of violation without detection and
the possibility of effective counter-measures.
  This further suggests that we will have to consider carefully the
order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the con-


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