FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


Soviet Union probably has felt it could not make any other assumption
than that the United States is working on such a weapon, especially in
view of the public discussion that has already taken place. It is difficult
to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union will make an intensive
effort to produce thermonuclear weapons. A decision to accelerate
our program may cause the Soviet Union to increase the priority of
these efforts. Knowledge by the U.S.S.R. that we had successfully
completed development of a thermonuclear weapon might have the
effect of increasing the probability that the USSR would successfully
develop a similar weapon. These are risks which are difficult to
measure, but which we must frankly face up to if a decision is made to
accelerate our development program.
  b. It does not appear likely that the character of United [States mili-
tary developments will have a decisive effect on Soviet military de-
velopments or be the cause of an arms race. The Soviet decision to
reequip its armies and devote major energies to developing war po-
tential, after the end of the war land at a time when we were disband-
ing our armies, was based on considerations more profound than our
possession of the atomic weapon.
   10. a. The possibility of the Russians' developing a thermonuclear
weapons capability, added to their probable growing fission bomb capa-
bility, re-emphasizes the importance of effective international control
of the entire field of atomic energy. Even if we can find a new approach
to the control of atomic energy which would be acceptable to us and to
our allies, 'and which offers greater prospect than the U.N. plan of
being negotiable with Russia, the necessary negotiations probably
could not be completed in less than a year and a half to two years.
But to delay an accelerated program of development for such a
period in the absence of adequate assurance that work in the Soviet
Union had been similarly delayed, would measurably increase the
prospect of prior Soviet possession of thermonuclear weapons.
   b. It has been suggested that a decision should be deferred until an
 approach 'has been made to the Soviet Union proposing that both
 nations forego work in the field of thermonuclear weapons. If such a
 proposal were coupled with a plan for the necessary safeguards to
 insure that the renunciation was in fact being carried out-these safe-
 guards necessarily involving an opening up of Soviet territory-it
 is the view of the Department of State that the proposition would be
 unacceptable to the Soviet Union to the same degree that the United
 Nations plan for the control of atomic energy is unacceptable. If not
 coupled with such safeguards, it is not believed that sufficient
 assurance would be gained from such an agreement to make it worth
 while.


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