NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


freedom to the victims of the Kremlin. This was much too large a
task. He thought that a mistake had been made in intermingling long-
range with short-range objectives. The same thing was true regarding
the objective of bringing about a change in the Soviet system. He much
preferred aphrase such as "living with the Soviet Union on tolerable
terms", which had appeared in an earlier draft of Section IV. He
suggested that for the next 20 years our objective should be to live
on tolerable terms with the Soviet Union and its satellites while avoid-
ing a war.
  Mr. Nitze pointed out that these objectives were in fact our long-
range ones and were distinguished from possible negotiating objectives
for the short-range period. He further stated that we, in the United
States, ,had a commitment in the form of the peace treaties to striving
for the long-range objectives.
  Dr. Conant pointed out that if our objective is to democratize every-
one, then our war objectives become something different; that is, un-
limited rather than limited. He agreed with the analysis of the calcu-
lated risk involved atthe bottom of page 13, and emphasized that
we must have more limited objectives for the next 20 years.
  Dr. Conant agreed with the first paragraph on page 15, but again
pointed out that the program was too ambitious as regards the satel-
lites. Regarding the question of the use of force by the Soviet Union
or. putting it another way, would the Soviet Union try to "get"
France
now, Dr. 'Conant believed that a far greater danger might be a series
of coups 6 la Czechoslovakia.
  Mr. Nitze stated that recent Soviet military literature refers con-
sistly to the Red Army as a precursor of revolution. We are in the
position of being unable: to prove either that the Soviets would or
wou"d not use force. Dr. Conant raised the same question in connec-
tion with Section V as a whole.
  Dr. Conant then wondered whether any analysis was made here
of the offensive as contrasted with the defensive characteristics of
Russian fighting ability.' They have shown themselves fanatical de-
fenders in the past. i-e wondered whether ideologically they could
be as fanatically aggressive. Would the average Soviet soldier fight
in order to spread Communism ?
  General Landon stated that this was a point that was constantly
discussed in the military and had been in an earlier draft. It was
suggestedthat this point might be woth a section.
  Dr. Conant suggested that the same thought, namely, would the
Soviet soldier fight as we'llabroad as at home, was pertinent in Sec-
tion V(D);. perhaps even more pertinentf here than in V(C) above.


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