NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY1


   In addition, he made three general observations: i(1) Our national
 policy must maintain the maximum possible flexibility. We must not
 saddle ourselves with self-denying ordinances which may prevent or
 seem to prevent us from doing certain things under any circumstances.
 There are very few things that a democracy cannot do if given a par-
 ticular combination of circumstances and necessity it is impossible
 to draw a sharp line between democratic principles and immoral ac-
 tions, and an. attempt to do so constitutes a dangerous and unnecessary
 handicap. (2) We should refrain from making any commitments
 which are neither absolutely necessary nor within our capacity to ful-
 fill. (3) We must realize that we are now in a mortal conflict; that we-,
 are now in a war worse than any we have ever experienced. Just
 because there is not much shooting as yet does not mean that we are
 in a cold war. It is not a cold war; it is a hot war. The only difference
 between this and previous hot wars is that death comes more slowly
 and in a different fashion.
   Mr. Lovett suggested that the Conclusions should be stated simply,,
 clearly, and in almost telegraphic style, or in what he referred to as
 "Hemingway sentences". le suggested that they should be along
the
 following lines: The Soviet expenditures on their military establish-
 ment are obviously too large to be for defensive purposes. The:
 Sov iet nionsmilitary establishment is obviously designed for offense.,
 The Russians have demonstrateda willingnessto use threats, compul-
 sion, and force to accomplish their ends. They have been .and are now
 using invisible means of 'aggression. By the desire ,and explicit choice
 of the Soviet, Union we have been designated the prime enemy of the
 Soviet Union. In view of these facts, the 'present course of the United
 States is inadequate to such an extent that it increases the dangers to
 freedom. It lis, therefore, our duty immediately to bring our military
 competence up to a higher level than has previously been planned and
 to.place in our hands, and those of our allies of proven courage and
 determination, the weapons designed .to meet our objectives.
 Mr. Lovett's Recommendations would be ,along the following lines:
 (1) The public must be supplied-with the facts.
   (2) Our intelligence facilities,,which are our first line of defense_
and which 'are grossly inadequate, should be brought to a high- state o f
effiiency.                         ..
  (3) Our national efforts in the -cold war must be specifically allo-
cated to a group headed by a man of recognized sture who has the,
equivalenAt of a 'Cabinet rank and the equivalent of the auuthority vested
in wartime, n jthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. This man and his agency
should. have a clear directive from the President and approprite
Congress'ional 'authorities.


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