NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


French make the less they have to fight for in Indo-China. They,
nevertheless, should receive such aid as the United States and the
United Kingdom can contribute.
   The cardinal point of the United States policy in Southeast Asia
 is that Indochina must not be permitted to fall before the Communist
 pressure which is not [sic] symbolized internally by Ho Chi Minh's
 movement, and externally by Chinese Communist troops on the Tonkin
 frontier. If Indochina is overrrun by the Communists, all oif the South-
 east Asian mainland would rapidly succumb. The strategic loss to
 the West and the resultant gain to the East would certainly make far
 more difficult our efforts to contain Communism elsewhere in the
 world.
   To achieve our objective, it is recognized that a strong nationalist
 anti-Communist counter-force must be developed in that area. The
 nucleus of such a movement in Indo-China is represented by the three
 Associated States of which the State of Vietnam is the largest. These
 governments must be supported and strengthened in every possible
 manner, politically, militarily and economically.
   The United States Military Aid Program for Indo-China is designed
 to help in the establishment of national armies, national guard and
 police forces for thethree States and to supply American military
 equipment to the Army of the French Union.
   The governments of the Associated States are being assisted in their
 efforts to develop their national armies in order to resist Communist
 fifth column and terrorist activities from within.
   16. Korea. Any projection of probable military assistancerequire-
ments for Korea for the post-hostilities period must be based upon
factors which cannot yet be assessed. The chief factors determining
the amount, character and timing of military assistance to Korea
include (a) the extent to which the UN will participate in any pro-
gram of military assistance to Korea; (b) the magnitude of the
internal security problem, including guerrilla operations; (c) the
extent to which the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union sup-
port and abet the guerrilla operations and border incursions; and
(d) the necessary size of Korean military forces to insure the internal
security and prevent border incursions.
  17. Formosa. On June 27, 1950, the President ordered the Seventh
Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary to this action,
the President called upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to
cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The President
stated that the determination 'of the future status of Formosa must
await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement
with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. The implementa-


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