618


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


rather than-military problems related to the armed- forces an4l
hemisphere defense. It is improbable that increased military strength-
would prevent violent political disturbances of this character. Fur-
thermore, there is no assurance that police and armed forces'will not
be infiltrated and subverted by communist and other totalitarian:
groups, in which event weapons would pass into the hands of people,
who would misuse them. This already has happened both in Latin'
America and in other parts of the world. There are numerous examples:
where weapons used in internal disturbances in foreign countries anu
in armed clashes between foreign countries are of U.S. origin. Inl
many cases, the United States has been criticized for contributing to
these acts of violence because of the fact that the weapons were of U.S.
origin.
   If the aggressor, in the event of war, had sufficient naval, am-
phibious, or air-power to land armed forces in the Western Hemi-
sphere, there would be a direct military threat. However, it seems more
probable that the immediate threat would be the political one of
infiltration and subversion accompanied by internal aggressive action
on the part of small but highly organized communist groups. Measures:
to counter this sort of threat lie in the political, economic, and social
fields. What is needed are representative governments that will com-
mnand the support of their peoples; efficient and loyal police forces
which will be immune to communist infiltration and control economic
and social improvements and raised living standards whiCh will pro-
vide strong support for stable governments and the maintenance of
order; and a faithful observance by all of the American Republics of
the principles of collective action for the common security and welfare.
   Paragraph 11 of the NSC paper recognizes that the Latin American
 forces required for the preservation of internal order are generally of'
 the type adaptable to police duty.
   It seems extremely doubtful that the Latin American nations will
 be economically and technically able within the next few years to sup-
 port military establishments which would provide any substantial
 combat strength in the event of a major war involving the nations
 of the Western Hemisphere. There also is a very real danger that sub-
 stantial increases in armed forces and armaments could result in a
 weakening of solidarity through the-aggravation of national fears
 and rivalries.
                            CONCLUSIONS
   United States interests-would be best served by an approach to the
 rio Treaty and to inter-American military cooperation different from
 the one set forth in NSC/56.
   A general strategic plan for hemisphere defense could well be
 studied by the Inter-American Defense Board. Over a period of timeý