-NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


   1.6 Hfelt hat t here is probably more informal grapevine type com-
 muniction'ibetween Russians inthe U.S S.R. than seems to be recog-
 nized by the paper./Mr. Ni'tze slaid -that we recognized'that in the paper
 as it stands now there. is a tendency to over-estimate Russilan strength
 and under-estimatte Russian weaknesses, a ndthat Chapter V is being
 redrafted with this thought in mind. In answer to -a question from
 Dr. Smyth, he added-that we have some specific suggestions to include
 as to whatmightbe done to capitalize on Russian weaknesses.
   2. Mr. Barnard said that he also felt that the paper under-estimates
 the economic potential of the United States in war-time; that we didn't
 even' find out in World WarII what this country could really do if
 pressed, _and that people can always take more punishment than is
 expected of them.
   3. He said that cohesion in our democracy isbasic to United
 States security -and that the government was going to need assistance
 in getting public support for the national effort which would be called
 for. This will be a difficult job for the. government to handle alone,
 because of the emphasis on security and the atmosphere of secrecy in
 which the government. works. He said that at the present time those
 who do most of the talking about the situation do not know the facts,
 and those who know the fa ctsdo not0 do much talking.: As an example
 of what he had -in mind, he pointed.out that 'a proposal by the Ad-
 ministrationr to extend ECA beyond 1952 would be attacked on
 political grounds and the Administration would be -accused of using
 scare-head tactics. Hle admitted that -a greater plat of -the information,
 needed to make decisions can be found in the press, magazines, books,
 and published documents, pointing out that the difficulty is that to
 those not on the inside it is extremely difficult if not impossible to)
 know which things one reads in such sources are fact and which
 are -fancy. ,He recognized the difficulty of making all infor-
 mation available to the public as a means of backing up the Admin-
 istration's proposals, .,and suggested that this could be handled in
 another way. Specifically, he advocated setting up a group of five
 or ten worthy citizens of good reputation and high integrity who -have
 no connection with the government,-who would have made avail-
 able to them all of the material on which the government based
 its conclusions, and who could then say to the people,. "We are
 thoroughly advised and you can accept what we say." Such a group
 should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It
 should have no strings attached to its right to make public its own
 conclusions.- 'In response to a request from Mr. Nitze for names, he
 suggested General Eisenhower (so long as he remains President of
 Columbia, and whose military background would be an asset rather
 than a liability in that his presence in the group would inspire public
 confidence on the military recommendations); James B. Conant; Dr.
 Sproul, President of the University of California;: a "sane, prominent
 churchman" (In this connection, he mentioned John Foster Dulles,5

 Member of the United States Delegations to most regular sessions of the
 United Naitions General Assembly since 1946; attended sessions of the Council
of Foreign Ministers in 1945, 1947, and 1949; interim United States Senator
from New York, 1949; appointed consultant to the Secretary of State, April
6,
1950.


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