NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY                      341

 position, should we not now recommend erring if anywhere on the
 "too much" side instead of on the side of "too little"?.
   Our national survival is now paramount over all other considera-
tions. Is it not possible that if we are 'to have any chance of maintain-
ing the freedoms we cherish above all else, any delay in taking the
action necessary to implement the President's policy may result in our
being too late?

117.2/7-1250
Me~morandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to
                         the Secretary of State

 TOP SECRET                              [WASHINGTON,] July 12, 1950.
 Subject: Relationship with the Defense Establishment 1
   Supplementing Mr. Jessup's memorandum to you on this subject,
 dated July 11, 1950 (copy attached),2 I1 wish to point out the following:
   1. For some time it has been virtually impossible to obtain speedy
and clear-cut decisions on matters involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the service departments, and the office of the Secretary of Defense.
The situation has become acute recently in connection with the work
on NSC-68 and NSC-73.
  2. Decisions have been obtainable swiftly only when events have
forced agreement at the highest level. However, this is undesirable
since these decisions are forced in haste, often without proper pre-
liminary thought and study, and, in any event, leaving a host of other
issues unresolved.
   3. In the preparation of NSC papers on politico-military matters
there is no way to obtain the views or comments of the service depart-
ments or the JCS at the drafting stage. As a consequence, conflicting
views are constantly brought to the NSC. This results in irritating
and time-consuming discussions which detract from the matters that
ought to receive the full attention of the NSC.
  This memorandum was presumably drafted in preparation for the July 12
meeting between Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Johnson,
and W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to President Truman, during which
the question of State-Defense liaison was among the topics discussed. Nitze's
memorandum of conversation of that meeting read in part as follows:
  "8. Secretary Johnson agreed that General Burns could not by himself
handle
all the complex relationships between the Defense and State Departments.
and
that one of his principal functions should be to establish lateral contacts
between
Defense and State. Secretary Johnson said that he would take steps immediately
to make it clear to the Defense Establishment that he approved of the develop-
ment of appropriate contacts between State and Defense and that such contacts,
once established, should be continued without specific clearance with General
Burns for each conversation. He agreed that it was more important that the
necessary contacts be developed than that specific rules for clearance with
General Burns be enforced.

  "10. Secretary Johnson agreed to H=arriman's suggestion that the Secretary,
Harriman and he have dinner together once a week." (Policy Planning
Staff
Files)
  2Not printed.
     496-362-77--23