NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


397


                                    FY1,951   FY 1952 . FY 1953
                                    %of.          of       %of
        Military Requirements       Supply     Supply     Supply
Steel                                2.34       4.47        5.46
Copper                              12.44      19.41       19. 64
Aluminum                             7.36      12.21       12.31
  Some time earlier, estimates of requirements in the event of full
mobilization were calculated by the military departments. These latest
available fgures, as received from the Department of Defense, follow-
                                    FY 1950   FY 1951    FY 1952
                                      %of       %of        %of
        Military Requirements       Supply     Supply     Supply
Steel                                58         59          46
Copper                               68.7      125.2       124. 5
Aluminum                            100. 4     154. 1      139.8
  On the basis of our own figures, therefore, we are now embarking
upon a build-up amounting to around 9% of what our most recently
circulated plan regarded as essential for true mobilization.
  In the first full year of World War II, 1942, about 31% of the na-
tion's, production was utilized for war purposes. Less than 8% of
that production, including MDAP, is planned for 1951.
  1 The Resources Board believes this current planning will result in
a defense program that is inadequate to meet the current menace to the
nation's security.
  We believe that the current communist aggression in Korea, plus
possible aggression against such other localities as Formosa, Indo-
China, Japan, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Germany, and the
United States itself, add up to a danger that is not being recognized by
such piecemeal plans for preparedness.
  The Resources Board recommends, therefore, that the National Secu-
rity Council review the current and contemplated defense programs
from the standpoint of their adequacy to afford as soon as possible
the military strength to support simultaneously:
  1. A winning effort in Korea.
  2. Adequate continental defense of the United States.
  3. A force-in-being sufficient to notify the Soviets that further com-
munist aggression, either overt or through satellites, will result in the
use of that force against Russia itself.
                                           W. STUART SYMEINGTON


                          Editorial Note
  On September 11, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson discussed the

world situation in executive session before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Commitnee; foirt'he record of his testimony, see RevieW8 of the,