FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive
for world domination.
  Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now
have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet
moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local
moves the occasion for war-for which we are not prepared. This
situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in
Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occu-
pation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our
allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm for-
eign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solu-
tions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An
important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in
its psychological impact-the revival of confidence and 'hope in the
future. It is recognized, of course, that any announcement of the
recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union
in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in
certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength
had been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in
the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the
essentially defensive character and care should be taken to Minimize,
so far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.
  2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives-to
the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary
though not a sufficient condition-are a renewed initiative in the cold
war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to
accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then
by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the
resources required for such a build-up-of strength. The other free
countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and
determination to do it will depend on the action the United States
takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign
political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic
conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is neces-
sary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and
for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and
democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.
   At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to-reduce the power
 and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas
 under its control. The objective would be'the establishment of friendly
 regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to
 engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an in-
 creased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other


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