..sNATIONAL. SECURITY ,POLICY ~~ - 147

it is a messianic faith that. not only spurs the USSR to assist the
transformation of the Marxist blueprint into,a reality, but also gives
the Soviet leaders a sense of confidence that. in whatever particular
course they follow they are riding the wave of the future.

Ve With: respect to particular: objectives, the present pattern of
Soviet moves is characterized, on the one hand, by constant attention
to consolidation of previous gains and, particularly, the establish-
ment of safeguards against dangers—real or imagined, external or
internal—to these gains; and on the other hand, by concentration on
soft spots, seizure of:every opportunity to move into: vacuum ‘areas
or.to exploit completely the momentum of ‘a successful development.
Since the present. pattern allows the USSR the same flexibility in
the choice: of particular tactics that has characterized: its postwar
strategy generally, it offers no dependable indication as to particular
future moves. Thus, for example, the USSR may, without breaking
the pattern, either remain in or withdraw from the UN, revive the
issue of the occupation of Berlin or maintain the-status gwo, force a
break in relations between the satellites and Western states or con-
tinue the present precarious arrangements. It can be assumed, how-
ever, that in any given situation a course will be adopted in
consequence of a careful Kremlin weighing of the opportunities
offered.as against the deterrents involved. This offers a fairly depend-
able means of estimating particular steps which may be taken during
coming weeks in regard to such areas as Indochina, Berlin, Austria;
the UN,, Korea, etc. Such estimates are in process of being prepared.

Beyond this the current pattern already seems 3 to indicate with
reasonable certainty that: re

( a) The USSR considers: this a. . favorable and 1 necessary moment
for increased political pressure, and, when feasible, taking aggressive
political action against all or most soft spots in its periphery; |

(6) Every effort will be made to establish and maintain effective
Soviet control in China; |

(¢) Southeast Asia will be a, primary area, of Soviet: Communist
action ; ce
(d) Moscow’ S insistence on unquestioning subservience by all Com-
munist Parties will be intensified, regardless of unfavorable local
repercussions; |

(e) The UN and.other media for regular diplomatic contact, will be
treated with increasing cynicism ;

(f) The insulation of the satellites from the West will be further
intensified. |