NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


side in favor of work[ing] harder for defense. Major changes are
taking place in the organization of agricultural production which
may be -sources of future strength, but are causing some weakness and
uncertainty at present. The same is true of the shake-ups in the fields
of scientific theorization and research.
  2. To touch off an outbreak of hostilities through a satellite on
another scene, China or the Balkans, which might be localized, for
a time at least, and cause a drain on the free world's resources and
increase the strain on its solidarity. This course would entail great
risk of Soviet involvement at a tempo unfavorable to the USSR. It
would seem that slow but direct progress to a major clash which would
allow the west to marshall preponderant military economic strength
and guarantee security of all western Europe as now occurring tempo-
rarily, would be highly detrimental to attainment of long-term
Soviet objectives.
  3. To play down the military aspect of this policy and while con-
tinuing to champion the North Koreans and to clamor for peace, allow
a settlement to work itself out in Korea over their protests perhaps
and an atmosphere of relaxation to set in giving the huge military
preparations in the west no place to go. This would offer the possi-
bility of a return by the West to the uncertain position of quandary
between expenditure of effort for defense or for economic progress
while the UJSSR continues a steady growth of industrial military
potential. This is a hard choice to make because it means an immediate
if perhaps temporary loss of prestige among the people who respect
power and success. However, this policy would permit the Soviets to
consolidate their present empire further and to utilize their rather
effective political and social weapons abroad even though they could
not count on major political victories where power played the dominat-
ing role.
   4. To 'continue to exploit the mystery of Soviet strength and keep
 the west heavily and uneconomically mobilized in the hopes that the
 economic burden will cause disaffection among the masses and make
 them defeatist and more receptive to Soviet peace blandishments. All
 economic and political controls in the direction of increasing western
 defense preparedness would be labelled as suppressive Fascist meas-
 ures and as deterioration of individual welfare grew the appeal of
 Communism as well as peace would increase. Continuance of or in-
 tensification of the war of nerves as well as the peace movement, along
 with continuous experimentation with organizational methods for
 controlling the attitudes of the masses would be features of such a proi-
 gram. The magnitude of defense allocations made since the end of
 June as compared with that of Marshall Plan aid could lead the
 Soviet rulers to the belief that this course has promise.
   Department pass London, Paris, Frankfort. Sent Department 386,
 repeated info London 93, Paris 84, Frankfort 58.
                                                              KIRK


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