FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL POLICY


than to create new and acrimonious discussions on the meaning of the
compromise; that the provisional nature of the GATT foreclosed the
possibility of any real progress through it; that the proposed discussion
might create animosities from the underdeveloped countries, many
of which were using such restrictions; and that the Czechs might seize
the occasion to raise the issue of our security controls. The ,New
Zealand delegation expressed'many of the same objections and added
that anything done ,which might be construed by the New Zealand
Government as creating annoying or onerous obligations might pro-
voke New Zealand's withdrawal from the GATT or refusal to ratify
the ITO.
  The US countered by pointing out that the importance of the prob-
lem was generally being underestimated; that there was a substantial
likelihood that the GATT could achieve important progress in this
field, thereby contributing to its prestige; and that the interests of
the UK and New Zealand, considering that they had few export re-
strictions, lay in lending their assistance to the exercise. It was also
pointed out that the issue then under consideration was whether the
item should go :on the agenda, rather than what the CP's should decide
with respect to export restrictions,
   As a result of these informal discussions and of similar discussions
 with the French, Dutch, Italian, Belgian and Canadian delegations,
 agreement was reached to list the item on the agenda and to set up a
 working party. As an integral part of the agreement, a set of instruc-
 tions was developed for the working party, directing it to review types
 of export restrictions used for "protective, promotional or other com-
 mercial purposes",
   The negotiations in the working party were prolonged but fruitful.
Two points should be mentioned. First, the UK delegation was co-
operative on all points, but was concerned that the report should not
condemn without qualification the use of export restrictions in con-
nection with the procurement of scarce materials. Second, the Secre-
tariat's first draft report, submitted informally to the UK, US and
Australian delegations before distribution, was so ambiguous, equivo-
cal and unhelpful to the US position as to require complete rewriting.
The rewriting was done by the US delegation and, after prolonged
discussion with the UK delegation, was concurred in by the latter after
some modifications. Thereafter the Secretariat submitted and the Con-
tracting Parties adopted the revised US draft report.
   (b) Quantitative Restrictions on Imports
   The instructions to the Delegation regarding import restrictions
 were less explicit than those relating to export restrictions. They were
 specific, however, in that they directed the delegation to obtain agree-


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