NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY3


  7. While the Kremlin was probably surprised and Unsettled by the
vigort of the initial:U.S., reaction and bythe overwhelming approval
of -theU.S. move throughout the rest of the non Conununist world,
these developments do not appear to have invalidated or modified
significantly the concept on which it was probably working.
  8. The reasons which: have led the Chinese Communist leaders to
yield to the Kremlin influence in cooperating'in this program are le-s
clear, and it is possible .that they are committing certain.political
blunders of which we may be able to take advantage in the coming pe-
riod. For the moment, however, we ',must recognize : that they are
heavily committed, by their own words and by the .logic of the
situation.
II. ,Pr~obable Fu~rth-er MOo yes in the Lieght of this Pattern of'-Intentionsý
  9. If this analysis of intentions is generally correct, the Kremlin
  a. Will not be inclined, with the Korean action now ,inprogress, to
commit its: own armed forces to actions which might be- expected to
lead to theoutbreak of anew world war;
  b. "Will encourage the international Communist movement, to take
every conceivable action to embarrass us at this time, particularly in
Asia; and'
  C.." Will make every effort to probe-the firmness of our-purpose.and
our nerves at other sensitive points, above all in Germany-and Austria,
where their forces come in contact with ours.
   10. Let us analyze each of these points:
   a. It' would appear that if the Kremlin does not wish to provoke
a world war, it will not launch overt military attacks with Soviet
forces against other countries in instances where it can be fairly sure
that general war would be the result. We cannot be certain of the
Kremlin's analysis on this point, but we believe that this would prob-
ably rule out overt military aggression by Soviet' forces at this time
against Greece and Turkey. The same general considerations apply
to Iran as to Greece and Turkey, except that the Kremlin might con-
sider that in the case of Iran it is less clear that the U.S. and U.K.
would react by interposing their forces. We believe, therefore, that
Soviet military demonstrations of force on the frontiers of these coun-
tries or in the Black Sea are primarily for purposes of intimidation
and political softening up and probably do not represent, if our
estimate of Soviet intentionstisganywhere near correct, a plan to
attack any of these countries at an early date.
  The cause ,of Yugoslavia is somewhat different. It is doubtful whether
the Kremlin concludes that we would go to war if Yugoslavia were
to be attacked either by its satellite neighbors alone, or by the .USSR
and the satclites. On the other hand, such a project bears other serious
disadvantales from'the Soviet standpoint. It would-tie Soviet and/or
satellite, forces up on a peripheral area, leaving the Atlantic Pact
group untouched and able to continue to build upitfs forces on the side-
line while Soviet and/or satellite military strength was being expended
against a well-entrenched opponent. It would involve the deliberate


333'