FOREIGN RELATIONSI 1950, VOLUME I


of Staff on the question of what the eventual possession of considerable
quantities of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union will mean to us in
terms of military position and strategy.
  5. I have assumed all along that if the Russians accepted the U.N.
Plan, before it was actually implemented, the Western Powers would
insist on substantial reductions in the Soviet land army and offensive
weapons. This is, of course, primarily a military question, but to me
it makes absolutely no sense for the U.S. to give up what General
Bradley 8-calls our chief offensive weapon without a fully compensa-
tory reduction in the offensive striking power of the Soviet Union. The
same situation, of course, applies in my view, to the temporary plan,
based on the suppression formula, put forward in the Planning Staff
paper; that is, we should agree to this only if the Soviet Union makes
compensatory reductions in its offensive striking power.
  6. The Soviet Union has, of course, known about the Squires and
Daniels suppression formula since it was first published in 1947. As
far as I am aware, they have never commented directly on it, but they
have frequently charged that the ruling circles in America wish to
obtain full control of all the atomic resources in the world in order
to deny the benefits to workers of countries which have inadequate
supplies of coal and oil. I seriously doubt whether the Soviet Union
would accept these proposals. If we ever decide to make such pro-
posals, we must be careful to see that they are presented in such a
way that we do not give the Soviet Union an enormous propaganda
weapon.
  7. It seems to me that the inspection provisions for the temporary
proposals described in the Planning Staff paper are in some particu-
lars inadequate. In any event, I do not believe that the Soviet Union
would find these inspection proposals, which are absolutely indispen-
sable to any suspension scheme, any more palatable than they find the
inspection proposals of the United Nations Plan.
  8. I am in full accord with the sections of the paper which stress
the importance of keeping the United Kingdom, Canada and France
fully informed of what we are doing.
  9. To recapitulate, I recommend that we stand on our present posi-
tion until we get the military information referred to in paragraph 4
of this memorandum, after which we should re-examine our policy in
the general security field.
                                               JoIHIv D. HICKEnSON
  'Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


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