162 _ FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

not require the mass destruction weapons for the establishment of an.
adequate military posture, are necessarily insincere in their stated
desire to see them effectively proscribed from the conduct of warfare.
This is not to say that our international situation 1s secure, or is one
that could justify complacency. As stated above, it is both difficult
and dangerous. But its basic elements are ones which were established

largely by the final outcome of hostilities in 1945. Nothing that re-

cently occurred has altered these essential elements; and in so far
as we feel ourselves in any heightened trouble at the present moment, |
that feeling is largely of our own making. | a

i

This being the case, the question remains as to the adequacy of our
present policy approach in the face of this situation. |

This approach, as I understand it, could be described as: follows:

We recognize that the outcome of the recent war left military
ascendancy on the Eurasian land-mass in the hands of a single power,
irrevocably hostile to that part of the international community which
does not recognize ‘its authority, and committed to its eventual sub-
jugation or destruction. It also placed this power in direct military
control of roughly half of Europe.

It thas been clear since the termination of hostilities that if this:
power broke out militarily and attacked the remainder of its former
allies in Europe the result, whatever its chance for permanency, would
obviously be in the immediate sense a major catastrophe, comparable
to that which would have occurred had the Nazis won their war in
Europe and forced England’s surrender. This had to be avoided, if
possible. But equally dangerous would have been a similar further
extension of Soviet power by political means; 1.e., by intimidation,
deceit, infiltration and subversion. This also ' had to be countered to the |
extent of our ability. |

‘There was a good possibility that the Russians themselves, recog-
nizing that this had serious disadvantages and dangers from their
own standpoint, had no intention of launching a military attack on
the rest of Europe at this juncture, and that they were planning to
base their action on means short of war.* Our best hope of avoiding
catastrophe lay in exploiting this possibility and in concentrating on
the strengthening of the resistance of other countries to Soviet politi-
eal aggression. |

6 Kennan’ s argument against the likelihood of an overt military attack by the
Soviet Union is set forth in George F. Kennan, “Is War with Russia Inevitable?
Five Solid Arguments for Peace,” Depa rtment of State Bulletin, February 20,
1950, pp. 267-271, 303. The article also appeared in the March issue of Reader’s
Digest.