FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, -VOLUME I


past several'years. They have no intention of stopping and aredeter-
mined to bring labout' ,a situation where we will be confronted by
having the rest of theworld under their -domination. Their method
is to wipe out centers of resistance wherever they existý by political
and-
economic undermining. We are the only real force in opposition to,
their movement, the only nation which has the ability and the re-
sources to help other nations fight world communism, We are, there-
fore, their primary target. They would like nothing better than to see
us standing alone, suddenly confronted with the realization that we&
had no friends outside of the hemisphere, thoroughly confused politi-
cally and economically.
  I explained that as I see it we must do two things. First, we must
continue to keep the door open to discussion with the Russians. Second,
we must build ourselves and our friends politically, economically and
militarily to a point where we have a united force with which to con-
front the Soviets. When we have accomplished this, we may then be
successful in reaching agreement with them. They may then be willing
to recede. However, even at that point we must not depend on their
good will. Even if agreement is reached we must not relax the strength
we have built up. To do so would merely invite them to back down on
their agreements at any point where they think they might get away
with it. In other words, we must create a situation of strength in op-
position to Soviet intentions of world domination, and maintain that
strength even after we may have reached agreement on the seven points
covered in my Berkeley speech. I assured him that I realized the many
steps we must take to achieve this strength. We will have to make
sacrifices. We must operate within the North Atlantic Pact and other
arrangements. We must strengthen the organization under the North
Atlantic Pact. We must have a political body of the North Atlantic
Pact countries capable of making top-level decisions expeditiously on
military plans.
  With specific reference to his two proposals, I said that I do not
think we should try to expel the iron curtain countries from the United
Nations but rather that we should constantly press to achieve a work-
ing arrangement within the United Nations which would allow it to
function, that we should keep pressing proposals for working arrange-
ments such as a voluntary agreement not to use the veto. I said that I
fear the breaking of diplomatic relations might have very bad reper-
cussions. If you sever ties completely, you have no basis for dealing
with those countries. Such a proposal might lead to war.
   At this point Mr. Herter said that he wondered whether it would
 be possible to bring about among the American people a realization of
 the seriousness of the situation without some domestic crisis, some-


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