:REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS'


  vations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national
  sovereignty and economic organization where .these are necessary -for
  security. The Government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first
  and is unwil~ing to accept measures which may impinge upon or'inter-
  fere rwith its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.
    "If thi fundamental difference could be overcome, other differences
  which have hitherto appeared unsurmountable could be seen in ,true
  perspective, and reasonable ground might be found for their
  adjustment."
    I wish to lay particular stress on the conclusion preached that the
  Soviet Union places its own narrow interpjreataton of- sovereignty
  ahead of any consideration of what the impact of this interpretation
  might have on world peace and security.
  I should like to recall also the behavior of -the Soviet Union since
  the General Assembly in the consultations among the permanent mem-
  bers. The General Assembly on November 23, 1949, passed the follow-
  ing resolution by 49 votes to 5:
  [Here ,follows the 'text of General Assembly Resolution 299 (IV:),
  November 23, 1949, 'which requesd the permanent members of the
  United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to continue their con-.
  sultations. For the text of Resolution 299 (IV), see Foreign Relcations8
  1949, volume I, page 225.]
  At the second meeting after the General Assembly and the four-
  teenth in the series of consultations on January 19, 1950, the Soviet
  Union, despite the solemn request of the General Assembly, walked
  out over the wholly extraneous and irrelevant issue of who should sit
  in the consultations for China. I was present at that meeting. I stated
  that the U.S. Government took the instructions of the-General As-
  sembly seriously and, had a different decision been made by the nations
  present regardingChinese representation, I had been under instruc-
  tions to proceed with the consultations. We continue to be ready to
proceed with these consultations whenever the Soviet Union chooses
to return to them. But I submit that unless and until the Soviet Union
decides to become a cooperating member of the world community and
to cooperate with the rest of the United Nations in the maintenance
of international peace and security, there is little prospect of any
agreement on the question of international control of atomic energy.
  The issues that separate us on this matter are fundamental ones.
They cannot be solved by any tinkering-with or modification of the
control system. That does not mean that we are rigid in our thinking
on this matter. On the contrary, we have repeatedly stated that we
would give serious and sympathetic consideration to any proposals
that might make the present United Nations plan either more work-
able or effective. We ourselves are constantly studying this problem


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