REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS


51


611.001/2-1150: Telegram
   The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
                   (Gross) to the Secretary of State

 SECRET                    NEW YORK, February 11, 1950-6:"23 p.nm,
   152. In connection with responses to Depcirtel February 3,1 follow-
 ing impression of climate of opinion at UN Headquarters re H-bomb,
 and press conference statements by President February 9, and Secre-
 tary February 8,2 may be of interest. Report represents initial reac-
 tions being expressed at Lake Success primarily by correspondents,
 NGO representatives, Secretariat officials and a few delegates rather
 than a systematic survey.
   Opinions are sharply divided, both as to consequence of present
 atomic deadlock, and as to actual meaning of policy indicated in
 Secretary's remarks. Views appear to fall into four major groups:
   (1) Small number of "continental realists" (largely European
newspapermen and delegates) hailedAmerican position and especially
Secretary's statement as sign Department has at last awakened to real
nature of Soviet policy.
   (2) MAajority however appear distressed by what they regard as
US closing door on negotiations.
   (3) Substantial namber express lack of conviction that US has
sufficiently re-examined possibility of achieving control agreement on
basis of some form of inspection, and require more than simple repeti-
tion of American position on atomic energy to be convinced.
   (4) 'Some, while -agreeing with Secretary's analysis of Soviet be-
havior, express view statement tactically unwise in saddling US with
onus of seeming to refuse to negotiate.
   Following views representative of those in group one: Sunde
 (Norway)3 declared H-bomb decision essential. De la Tourneile
 (France) said "Secretary's statement excellent although might not be
 readily understood by those'who have not had to deal with Russians".
 A  French correspondent -referred to 'Secretary's citing of Berlin,
 Greece, Turkey as showing understanding that only thing Stalin
 respects is military force, and that only negotiation possible would
 be ona basis-of "one more step and it means war
 Most Secretariat officials and NGO's expressing views, however,
 were in second group. Secretariat sources, possibly reflecting Lie's

 "The circular telegram underi-reference, not printed, requested estimates
of
public reaction to President Truman's I-I-bomb production announcement (see
foot-
note 1, p. 513) and associated discussion in the United States (711.5611/2-350).
  For text of :Secretary Acheson's statement of February 8, see Department
of State Bulletin, February 20, 1950, pp. 272-274., At his press conference
of
February 9, President Truman expressed concurrence with Acheson's remarks;
for the record of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United
States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, pp. 149-153.
  " AmbassadorArne Sunde, Permanent Norwegian Representative at the
United
Nations.