NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


  d. In the, event of overt attack by organized :Chinese communist
forces-against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself
to become engaged in a general war with Communist China, but
should, in concert with the U.K., support France and the associated
states, and accelerate and expand the present military assistance;
program.
Non-Military Moves by the ISSR
  42. Berlin Blockade. In the event the USSR        re-imposes the
Berlin blockade, the United States should react at once since the main-
tenance of our position in Berlin is of great importance tothe interests
of the United States. The matter should be immediately referred to
the United Nations. Although the, re-establishment of the full-scale
airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present
conditions, a partial airlift should be established by the United States,
the United Kingdom, and any other states able and willing to con-
tribute pending the completion of a study now under way regarding
the measures to be taken to meet such a situation.
   43. Vienna Blockade. In the event the USSR should impose a
blockade of Vienna, the establishment of a full-scale airlift would
be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present conditions.
The United States should implement existing policy (NiSC 38/6) 11
to the extent feasible, utilizing a partial airlift to be established by
the United States, the U.K. and any other nations able and willing
to contribute.
   44. Iran. In the event of internal subversion leading toward the
establishment of a communist-dominated government in Iran, the
United States should:
   a. Accelerate its assistance to the legitimate Iranian Government.
   b. Consider seeking an agreement in the UN on charging the USSR
 with direct responsibility for conditions in Iran.
   45. While recognizing the importance of United States assistance
 and support of the United Nations, and while wholly supporting, its
 aims and objectives, the United States cannot yet rely on the United
 Nations as the sole instrumentality for safeguarding essential United
 States security interests.-
   46. Before commitment is made for any action contemplated in this
 paper involving use of military forces the Department of Defense will
 be consulted for a last minute evaluation as to the military soundness
 of the decision in the light of the military commitments and capabili-
 ties existent at the time.

   'Regarding NSC 38/6, "Future Courses of Action with Respect to Austria,"
 a report approved by President Truman on May 5, 1950, see editorial note
which
 is scheduled for publication in volume. iv.
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