FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0,VOLUME I


for the purposes:of thispaper, too mUch attention is devoted tothis
section. This tends somehow to blur the sharp edge of the effectiveness
of the paperby diverting attention to questions which lie- more in the
realm of political philosophy and which-I do not believe are a subject
of doubt by the American Government, This might be very good ma-
terial for publication, speeches, or other media, buttends to, detract the
readers attention from the central core of ths paper by the dangerous
and growing discrepancy between Soviet military power and thut of
the',free world. I would therefore suggest that this material be short-
ened, leaving only those parts which-make it-plain that the' Soviet
Union is an-implacable enemy of the -United States and all it stands
for andcan only be checked by a sufficient strength. to render recourse
to war suicidal fo6rtih.e ienwhorunRussia.n
   (2) I Would suggest that the N.S.C. paper be either referred to or
taken out of the conclusions and recommendations, since that is sup-
posedly already adopted American policy.
   (3) Since for understandable reasons-it is not up to the State
Department to make a detailed estimate of the military requirements
in the situation, which I gather is the reason why the recommendation
is left very generial-on this point, it- seems to me wise.for us to spell
out in greater detail .what we think is necessary in the political and
economic fields-in order to enhance the chance of success in the cold
war.,..
  (4) In the military field, I believe we should emphasize very
stronzgly the importance' from the point of v'iew. ofour over-all policy
and those of our :allies, of an intelligent direction in the building up
of our armed forces whereby we would draw Upon our:technologica.l
and scientific superiority for the: development of new weaponsof War
which could :achieve : the same result advantageously at less than the
cost of mass 'production of present standard weapons. For example,
we could concentrate -our. attention through research and development
on tlie f u rther development of: (a) anti-tank weapons, (b)&guided
missiles in defense: against aircraft, (c) development of fighter inter-
cept-or aircraft, f(d)-anti-submarine measures, and (e) the: effective
striking force of strategic bombers.
  It would-seem appropriate in this-conneotion that the 'Department
  of State might point out the great political and psychological ad-
  vantages of development, i Europe particularly, a military establish-
  ment centered. around these weapons. (a) It would be primarily
  defensive and hence Would mitigate any risk of provocation and
  render more difficult the present successful exploitation of Soviet
  propaganda charge that we are preparing aggressive warfare. (b),It
  would permit, if the development of new weapons of this type were
  successful, the creation of a much smaller semi-professional army
  which could eliminate the very real danger of Communist infiltration
  in the Armed Forces, which would certainly occur in any large scale
  mobilization in Western Europe. (c) It would imp6se a very much
  smaller strain on, our respective economies.


224