FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


make even more clear than we have so far that North KCorean success
is due to Soviet training, equipment and military advice. It seems
doubtful, however, that we would wish at that late date to come out
with a direct accusation that the Soviets had initiated the North
Korean aggression. The temper of the U.S. public under those con-
ditions would already be more excited and, should we stimulate it in
this way at that time, we might find ourselves under very heavy
pressure to take action against the USSR for which we should neither
be prepared ourselves nor be able to obtain the support of other UN
members.
  The second part of the underlying paper relates to our policy in
  case of a new aggression by a Soviet satellite. It is difficult to lay
down
a firm line without knowing the circumstances of such an aggression,
but obviously important to work out our line in advance insofar as
possible. I have personally never felt that the fact we might bluntly
accuse the Soviets of responsibility for a satellite's aggression would
provoke them into a more direct involvement than they had otherwise
intended. They are too realistic to allow their policy to be governed
by the character of our propaganda. On the other hand, the effect of
such a direct accusation on our own policy and public opinion must
be considered. We would presumably not wish to make the accusation
in such terms and circumstances, e.g., in the UNSC, which would set
in motion a chain of action which would be likely to go beyond what
was consonant with our capabilities at the time. However, as long as
the accusation were kept within a primarily propaganda framework,
I do not believe we would need hesitate to state openly the facts which
were generally known. On the contrary, I think there might be ad-
vantage in so doing since, insofar as we could pin the responsibility
for aggression on the Kremlin, we would queer their whole propa-
ganda pitch at home and abroad and to that extent weaken their
position in wavering areas and hence possibly encourage a slightly
more cautious strategy on their part.
  While there is much to be said for such a frank approach in case
of aggression by the European satellites, a similar attitude in case of
-aggression by Communist iChina would seem to raise more problems.
Would it be to our advantage to claim that the USSR is responsible
for a Chinese attack on Formosa, Indochina or Burma? There is
clearly a good deal to be said on both sides of this question and it
should be very carefully examined before a decision is taken.


372