FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


   5. That moral considerations are not germane to the limited objec-
 tive covered by this problem, i.e., -the development and test of the
 weapon to determine its feasibility. Determination of production and
 use of the weapon is likewise outside the province of this problem.

                             DISCUSSION
   6. See Annex 1.
                            CONCLUSIONS
   Z. The United States military position with respect to the develop-
ment of the -thermonuclear weapon should be:
   a. Possession of a thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without
such possession by the United States would constitute a situation
fraught with danger to the United States, and must be avoided.
  b. It is imperative to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear
explosion, and its characteristics, at the earliest practicable date. This
determination is essential for United States offensive and defensive
planning, and direction of research and development.
  c. If a thermonuclear weapon is determined to be feasible, the fol-
lowing considerations pertaining to military requirements are cur-
rently evident
       (1) Possession of such weapons by the United ,States may act
     as a deterrent to war.
       (2) Possession of such weapons by the United States will pro-
     vide an offensive weapon of the greatest known power possibilities
     thereby providing increased flexibility and effectiveness to our
     operations in the event of hostilities.
  d. The cost in money for materials, and the research and industrial
effort of this determination of feasibility is estimated at between 100
and 200 million dollars by the Atomic Energy Commission. This is
within the capabilities of the United States. The USSR has the same
capability.
  e. When used against especially selected remunerative targets the
thermonuclear weapon, if feasible, can be utilized in lieu of a greater
number of fission bombs. This would enable the delivery of a given
amount of damage in less time with less exposure and with greater
effectiveness than through the employment of a greater number of
fission bombs. Furthermore, the weapon promises to be more efficient
in utilization of available ore and production capacity per unit area
of damage.
  f. A unilateral decision on the part of the United States not to
develop a thermonuclear weapon will not prevent the development of
such a weapon elsewhere.
  g. It should be possible to maintain the necessary military secrecy
on a subject of such importance to the security of the United States.
However, it is believed that development of this weapon as a complete
surprise to the USSR is not possible.
  h. In summary, from the military point of view, determination of
the technical feasibility of the thermonuclear explosion is essential.
This does not imply a "crash" or "all-out" program, but,
on the con-
trary, an orderly and economical solution of the problem.


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