NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


be in a position to attain our objectives without war. or, in the event
of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic
or tactical purposes.
C. International Control of Atomric Energy.
  1. A discussion of certain of the basic considerations involved in
securing effective international control is necessary to make clear why
the additional objectives discussed in Chapter IX must be secured.
  2. No system of international control could prevent the production
and use of atomic weapons in the event of a prolonged war. Even the
most effective system of international control could, of itself, only
provide (a) assurance that atomic weapons had been eliminated from
national peacetime armaments and (b) immediate notice of a violation.
In essence, an effective international control system would be expected
to assure a certain amount of time after notice of violation before
atomic weapons could be used in war.
  3. The time period between notice of violation and possible use of
atomic weapons in war which a control system could be expected to
assure depends upon a number of factors.
  The dismantling of existing stockpiles of bombs-and the destruction
of casings and firing mechanisms could by themselves give little assur-
ance of securing time. Casings and firing mechanisms are presumably
easy to produce, even surreptitiously, and the assembly of weapons
does not take much time.
  If existing stocks of fissionable materials were in some way elimi-
nated and the future production of fissionable materials effectively
controlled, war could not start with a surprise atomic attack.
  In order to assure an appreciable time lag between notice of vio-
lation and the time when atomic weapons might be available in quan-
tity, it would be necessary to destroy all plants capable of making
large amounts of fissionable material. Such action would, however,
require a moratorium on those possible peacetime uses which call for
large quantities of fissionable materials.
  Effective control over the production and stockpiling of raw mate-
rials might further extend the time period which effective interna-
tional control would assure. Now that the Russians have learned the
technique of producing atomic weapons, the time between violation of
an international control agreement and production of atomic weapons
will be shorter than was estimated-in 1946, except possibly in the field
of thermonuclear or other new types of weapons.
  4. The certainty of notice of violation also depends upon a number
of factors. In the absence of good faith, it is to be doubted whether
any system can be designed 'which will give certainty of notice of
violation. International ownership of raw materials and fissionable


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