FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


modific~ation in he Uni~ted Nationsplan. Present indicationsgare that
nO important modificationin the plan iscalled for.
  I believe we can be assured-that from the technical-point &f view,
atomic energy can be cOntrolled and atomic weapons of all types can
be effectively prohibited. WeWcan also be assured that t he6nly plan
-that' human ingenuity has been able o: develop-so far to do this:is the
plan developed in the United-Nations Atomic Energy-Comiion and
approved by an overwhelming vote of the1General Assembly ofthe
ýUnited Nations in 1948 and again in 1949. In the last General As-
sembly, only the Soviet bloc, now fivestates, voted againstit,.
   The fundamental question is not feasibility ofcontro1l it is rather
 the question of the refusal of theSoviet Government to agree: to the
 only effective control system so far devised. Realization of this fact
 is, in my view, essential to any sound evaluation of the siuationwhich
 confronts us. If we are to get agreement on effective control and -effec-
 tive prohibition, we must have a willingness and a desire on the part
 of all concerned to reach such an agreement. If the Soviet Union has
 ever had in mind a willingness to'negotiate such a system, ithas suc-
 cessfully concealed it from us. This is not a conclusion that we have
 arrived at easily Or without reluctance. It is a conclusion that is forced
 upon us as the only explanation for the Soviet behavior in over four
 years of debate and discussion of the ,problem of international control.
   Now I am not saying that the Soviet Union does not want agree-
 ment. They do want agreement, but on their own terms. These are
 that nations agree to a convention providing for the prohibition and
 the destruction of atomic weapons without any system of safeguards
 that could give any promise at all that nations would abide by this
 agreement. The Soviet Union is always willing to agree that: We
 destroy our atomic weapons.
    When we come to the question of why the Soviet Union refuses to
  accept any effective system of international control, we are forced to
  deduce the real reasons for their refusal, not their stated reasons. In
  this connection, it is well to remember that never once has any Soviet
  representative stated that the United Nations plan would not bean
  effective one. This point has been made on a number of occasions by
  U.S. representatives and has never been challenged by the Soviet
  representative. One-reason why the Soviet Union has refused to give
  serious consideration to any effective system is the fact they feel that
  any such System would be a breaching of the Iron Curtain. This, ap-
  parently, the Soviet Union cannot accept, whatever the consequences
  might be for international peace and security.
    Another reason that comes to mind is the fact that the alternative
  to no agreement on international control is not necessarily unpleasant
  for the Soviet Union. It is unpleasant for the democracies for the


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