NATIONAL- SECURITY POICY


  Assumes at least a possibility that the Soviet willstrike that blow
at or after that critical date;-
  Carefully calculates :the economic and= psychological risksdomes-
tically and internationally, of overtly mobilizingto'ward such a critical
date. And then, following ra program tailored to -these calculations,
  Marshals this country's resources to-a degree- which might insure"
its survival on the assumed critical date and for :at least three
years of shooting war thereafter. This to be attempted through a
government-wide, organized program which
  Integrates and aggressively.prosecutes the so-called ",cold war"
elements with the objective that a*shooting war by the critical date
might be, averted, or if not averted, at least minimized in its effect
upon the security of this country.
  While there is general agreement among all Ad Hoc Committee
agencies concerned as to the need fo~ran over-all organization and
prosecution of the "cold war" elements concurrent "with'a
military
build-up sufficient to deter Soviet attack upon this.country, there is
not general agreement as to whether the possibility of Soviet attack
by 1954 or anyý earlier or later date exists.
  The disagreement as to whether the Soviets can or will eventually
attack the United States seems to be based upon the following elements:
  A disagreement as to whether or not this country can, concurrent
with its cold war program, build a sufficient anti-aircraft, anti-
submarine, and anti-sabotage defense between now and any fore-
seeable critical date, sufficient to defer that date;
  A variety of interpretations of available intelligence as to what
  Soviet Russia has and might have by 1954 or earlier in the way of
  atomic striking force;
  A difference of opinion as to whether or not Soviet Russia would
  use such-a striking force if and when it gets it.
  The NSRB, basing its opinions on the best available facts, concludes
that:
   There is an obvious possibility that Soviet Russia will have and
intends to use the atomic strength to attack this country by 1954 or
earlier.
   The United States cannot, during the next two years, more than
 slightly defend itself against any air, sea or sabotage attack upon itself,
   That the United States cannot erect, even by 1954 or later, a defense
 that. wuld be more than 50% effective against air, sea, or sabotage
 attack, regardless 'of, the money, materials and manpower devoted to
 its construction,
   SAndIthat the best, though by no means certain defense against Soviet
 atomic attack lies in a combination of the maximum military and
 civil defense obtainable, plus a retaliatory bombing force sufficient to
 impress the Soviets with the1 fact that a lethal atomic attack upon the
 United States means a lethal atomic attack on Soviet Russia.


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