RGULATION OF ARMAMENT$-41


for a leisurely series, ,of informal meetings with some suitable Soviet.
repres-entative, so intarspersed-that- therewould be plenty of ime
for reports to governments arid for the receipt of governmental guid-
ance between encounters. It would be bt, ,for this purpose; to avoid
on both sides the personalities and channels involved in the U.N.
discussions to-date,.
   The U.S. representative in such discussions would avoid giving the
 impression ,that hoe was rn-aking "new proposals" or wag reflecting
a
 ichange of heart in this GoVernment. He would rather take 6the part.
 of one who was trying to get to the bottom of Soviet objections to
 the present: plan and 'to'.see  hether variations could be -found which
 coud obviate these objections. ie would make it plan that though
 he was in touch with the highest cicleýs 'in his gvernment aund they
 were interested in whatever impressions or suggestions he may gather,
 he was not speaking as a plenipotentiary empowered to make agree-
 ments; he could only recommend to his Government; and any con-
 sequences which might flow from the conversations would eventually
 have to find aceptance not only in his Governmenit but in the
 "competent iternational bodies.
   It is realized that these conversations might leadinto other funda-
mentalproblems of U ,S.-Soviet relations, the US, position on whicfr
would have to be determined in the light of the ,conditions then
prevailing.
   In theois-discugsions, the U.S. representative might sound out his
Soviet counterpart along the following lines:
   (1) a plan which could be temporary, and in the n atute of a t'chi
nical and political n-odws vivendi, rather than permanent;
   (2) complete prohibition of atomic weapons -0f every sort;
   (3), the abandonment of large reactors for this period;
   (4) disposition- of fissionable materials to be insuch a way as to
give reasonable assurance against any one-sided advantage by seizure,
if and whenagreement becomes permanent;'
  (5) non-dangerous activities to be left in national hands, but only
,on the condltion of complete "openness" of research and development
activity;
  (6) no international control authority and no veto provisions;
  S(7)stagesso arranged that termination of activity in large reactors,
establishment of formal U.N. custody of large rgactors and stocks of
nuclear fuels, establishment of U.N. supervision over raw material
sources, and prohibition of the weapon would all take place simul-
taneously; and.
   (8} an inspection system involving:
      .;(a) a complete showdown on existing operaktions including
    full accounting and verification of raw materials utiiized to date,
    existinxg reserve ad pipeline stocks, nuclear fuelse poduc, etc.;


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