FOREIGN RELATIONS,: 1950, VOLUME I


it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view of our vul-
nerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued that we might
wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retaliation against prior
use by the U.S.S.R. To be able to do so and still have hope of achiev-
ing our objectives, the non-atomic military capabilities of ourselves
and our allies would have to be fully developed and the political
weaknesses of the Soviet Union fully exploited. In the event of war,
however, we could not be sure that we could move toward the attain-
ment of these objectives without 1the U.S.,S.R.'s resorting sooner or
later to the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming
atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the
U.S.S.R. be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we pro-
gressed toward the attainment of our objectives.
  In the event the U.S.S.R. develops by 1954 the atomic capability
which we now anticipate, it is hardly conceivable that, if war comes,
the Soviet leaders would refrain from the use of atomie weapons
unless they felt fully confident of attaining their objectives by other
means.
  In the event we use atomic weapons either in retaliation for their
prior use by the UTS.S.R. or because there is no alternative method
by which we can attain our objectives, it is imperative that the strategic
and tactical targets against which they are used be appropriate and
the manner in which they are used be consistent with those objectives.
  It appears to follow from the above that we shouldproduce and
stockpile thermonuclear weapons in the event they prove feasible and
would add significantly to our net capability. Not enough is yet known
of their potentialities to warrant a judgment at this time regarding
their use in war to attain our objectives.
  3. It has been suggested that we announce that we will not use
atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such
weapons by an aggressor. It has-been-argued that such a declaration
would decrease the danger of an atomic attack against the United
States and its -allies.
  In our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional
weapons, such a declaration would be interpreted by the U.S.S.R. as
an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication
that we intended to abandon them. Furthermore, it is doubtful-whether
such a declaration would be taken sufficiently seriously by the Kremlin
to constitute an important factor in determining whether or not to
attack the United:States. It is to be anticipated that the Kremlin
would weigh the facts of -our capability far more heavily than a
declaration of what.we proposed-to do with that capability.
  Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make
such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will


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