NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


ernment of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termina-
tion, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the
Congress of the United States."
  Two points should be noted in this resolution: (1) the initiative does
not come from the United States;
   (2) "all of the resources" of the United States are pledged
to the
successful termination of the conflict.
  The state of war established by resolution is customarily terminated
by peace treaty. There has been no peace treaty between the United
States and Japan nor between the United States and Germany; a
technical state of war exists with those countries, although the Presi-
dent has proclaimed the cessation of hostilities (see L       memo
attached.)2
   The consequences of the declaration of a state of war are clear from
the terms of the resolution. With its approval by the President, we
start down a road from which there is no turning back. We pledge all
our resources, human and material, to winning the war. We will to
fight until one of the parties capitulates or there is a negotiated peace.
  What would be the outcome if the United States entered into a
state of war against the Soviet Union? "Thile it is assumed that- the
Soviet Union could not now win a war against the United States, it is
improbable that the United States could now -fight a war against the
Soviet Union to the point of the latter's unconditional surrender. This
is recognized in NSC 20/4,8 which states that we should endeavor in
such a war to accomplish our objectives "without a predetermined
requirement for unconditional surrender". It should be a war of
limited objectives, and one which might be terminated without a
peace treaty.
   With this in mind, and realizing that since it is not Communist
 practice to issue a declaration of war the initiative would have to
 come from us, we should use the device of recognition of a state of
 war only as a final resort. We should not thus generalize hostilities
 and restrict our freedom of action unless the Soviet Union affronts
 us in such a manner that no other course is possible, or unless we decide
 that a generalization of hostilities is in our National interest.
   We should leave ourselves free to take limited military action
 against Soviet forces without a declaration, if this seems advisable.
 We have considerable maneuverability for this purpose.
   The President's Proclamation of unlimited national emergency of
 May 27, 1941 is still in effect. In it the President (1) proclaims that

 2The memorandum does not accompany the source text.
 3 NSC 20/4, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet
 Threats to U.S. Security," a report by the National Security Council,
Novem-
 ber 23, 1948, is in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.


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