FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


successfully functioning political and economic system in the free
world.
  There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to .isolate our-
selves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a course of action,
for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony
by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps
even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United
States.
   This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the
United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the prob-
ability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia,
probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a
potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to
develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power,
which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an
obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is
no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by com-
plete submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end con-
demn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with
drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison
with the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are
prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, be-
cause of over-extension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy
itself from within.)
   The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless
 drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of a
 deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to
 dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel
 a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their
 former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the resources
 of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened
 its threat to our security, some would be tempted to accept "peace"
 on its terms, while many would seek to defend the United States by
 creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of
 a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of
 affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and
 vitality of our system subverted.
    Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless
  on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of
  importance.
    It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many
  Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union
  and the, area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter de-
  (.isi vely the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern


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