FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


  3. In the face of our intervention, the Soviet leaders have naturally
followed with most intense interest the subsequent course of military
operations. They refrained from engaging air forces after our entry
into the picture, probably because such air strength as they had as-
sembled in the theater of operations was intended for support of the
North; Koreans against the South Koreans alone, and was neither
sufficient (momentarily) nor expendable for operation against U.S.
They have no doubt been surprised and impressed with ground suc-
cesses of the North Koreans even in face of a total renunciation of the
air arm on their own part and the consequent unlimited freedom of
air operation on the part of their adversary. (This will quite probably
affect their estimates of Soviet military capabilities in other areas.)
  4. As North Korean forces approached the end of the peninsula,
the Soviet leaders naturally envisaged the possibility that we would
be driven out entirely. Their re-entry into U.N. was doubtless decided
upon in light of this eventuality, since the period immediately follow-
ing our ejection would obviously be the best moment to strike for a
United Nations settlement which would bar our re-entry and thus
seal the accomplishment of their purpose.
  5. Nevertheless, they have been keenly aware of the converse possi-
bility (namely, that we would not be forced out) and know that in
this case several disturbing factors would arise from their point of
view; notably:
  (a) A great portion of North Korean strength was probably com-
mitted and expended in the initial effort to force us out; if this effort
is unsuccessful, a period of exhaustion and depletion of reserve
strength might ensue on the North Korean side, just as the U.N. forces
were beginning to build up strength.
   (b) The Kremlin, having expected to complete the Korean opera-
tion on special supplies stock-piled for the purpose and being unwilling
to deplete to any appreciable extent the arsenals of the Far Eastern
Red Army, may find itself in a relatively poor position to conduct a
war of attrition at a point some 5,000 miles from Moscow.
  (c)' Communications for the North Korean army are presumably
steadily deteriorating under our bombings.
  The Kremlin leaders are therefore well aware that the military
fortunes might easily soon be altered to their disfavor.
  5. [sio] Furthermore, the Soviet leaders must be seriously worried
over the proximity of the Korean fighting to their own borders and
over the direct damage which can conceivably be done to their military
interests by any extension of the area of hostilities. It is probable that
their strategic interests in the Soviet Far East have already been
directly affected by -the destruction of industrial installations of mili-
tary significance in North Korea. If our forces should begin to ad-
vance, it might become necessary for the Soviet command to draw on


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