FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


    tary commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove
    unavoidable.
      "b. Assure the internal security of the United States against
    dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.
      "c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthen-
    ing of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential
    reserves readily available in the event of war.
      "d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of
    the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are
    able and willing .to make an important contribution to U.S.
    security, to increase their economic and political stability and
    their military capability.
      "e. Place the maximum     strain on the Soviet structure of
    power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and
    the satellite countries.
      "f. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant : of the
    threats to-our national security so that it will be prepared to
    support the measures.which we must accordingly adopt."
  In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities,
the action which can be taken under present programs and plans,
however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope,
to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United
States political, economic, and military objectives which is now
imperative.
  A continuation of present trends would result ,in a serious decline
in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its
satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of cur-
rent programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives
and aims. These trends lead .in the direction of isolation, not by de-
liberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous
initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.
  Our position as the center of power in the free world places:a'heavy
responsibility upon the United States for leadership.,We must organize
and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive
program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world
domination by creating a situation in the,/free world to which the
Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a -cooperative
effort, led by the United States, we will 'have to make gradualwith-
drawals under/pressure until we discover one day: that we have
sacrificed positions of vital interest.
  It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid
and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States
and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this
will be costly and Will involve significant domestic financial and eco-
nomic adjustments.


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